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“Any	  deed	  that	  any	  human	  being	  has	  ever	  committed,	  however	  horrible,	  is	  
possible	  for	  any	  of	  us—under	  the	  right	  or	  wrong	  situational	  circumstances”	  
(Zimbardo,	  2007).	  
	  
Over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  20th	  century	  genocide	  has	  been	  responsible	  for	  the	  murder	  of	  
more	  than	  170	  million	  people;	  it	  is	  has	  proven	  to	  be	  four	  times	  deadlier	  than	  war	  (Voth,	  2007).	  
Although	  it	  often	  appears	  spontaneous,	  Genocide	  is	  instead	  a	  result	  of	  certain	  preconditions.	  	  
Studies	  into	  the	  causes	  of	  genocide	  ought	  to	  aid	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  methods	  intended	  to	  keep	  
violence	  from	  occurring.	  Unfortunately,	  seemingly	  different	  factors	  such	  as	  economic	  crisis,	  
resource	  scarcity,	  institutional	  weakness,	  and	  ethnic	  resentment	  prove	  difficult	  to	  classify	  as	  the	  
ultimate	  cause.	  Instead	  these	  conditions	  work	  collectively	  to	  create	  an	  atmosphere	  that	  is	  
conducive	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  genocidal	  behaviors.	  These	  preconditions	  can	  be	  specific	  to	  the	  
cultures	  in	  which	  they	  arise;	  however	  there	  exists	  a	  continuity	  with	  which	  genocide	  may	  be	  
characterized.	  All	  these	  conditions	  may	  be	  exacerbated	  by	  the	  common	  existence	  of	  a	  norm	  
entrepreneur.	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  paper,	  a	  norm	  entrepreneur	  is	  an	  individual	  that	  holds	  
some	  appearance	  of	  power	  which	  he/she	  uses	  to	  create	  or	  recreate	  social/societal	  norms	  
through	  which	  polarizing	  attitudes	  are	  formed.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  genocide,	  these	  individuals	  may	  
use	  a	  variety	  of	  methods	  intended	  to	  foster	  an	  atmosphere	  of	  hate.	  I	  argue	  that	  norm	  
entrepreneurs	  are	  a	  catalyst	  to	  the	  emergence	  and	  growth	  of	  specific	  norms;	  and	  in	  the	  case	  of	  
genocide,	  they	  are	  a	  necessary	  precursor	  to	  group	  polarization	  and	  ethnic	  violence.	  While	  the	  
presence	  of	  a	  norm	  entrepreneur	  is	  merely	  one	  of	  many	  factors	  that	  contribute	  to	  the	  




To	  begin	  I	  define	  the	  role	  of	  the	  norm	  entrepreneur	  while	  also	  describing	  how	  he/she	  
may	  alter	  individual	  and	  group	  behavior.	  Following	  are	  a	  series	  of	  studies	  that	  demonstrate	  
how	  a	  norm	  entrepreneur	  may	  influence	  an	  individual	  or	  group	  to	  commit	  acts	  of	  genocide.	  For	  
example,	  the	  results	  of	  Philip	  Zimbardo’s	  study	  Diary	  of	  an	  Abandoned	  Automobile	  speak	  to	  the	  
context	  of	  anonymity	  and	  the	  role	  it	  plays	  in	  the	  appearance	  of	  evil	  behaviors	  (Zimbardo,	  2007).	  
Also,	  Zimbardo’s	  Stanford	  Prison	  Experiment	  illustrates	  that	  an	  individual	  may	  single-­‐handedly	  
create	  an	  environment	  in	  which	  evil	  behaviors	  may	  arise	  while	  simultaneously	  displays	  how	  the	  
arbitrary	  creation	  of	  groups	  can	  lead	  to	  in-­‐group/out-­‐group	  polarization	  and	  dehumanization	  
(Zimbardo,	  2007).	  Moreover,	  the	  results	  of	  Stanley	  Milgram’s	  experiment	  on	  obedience	  
indicate	  that	  individuals	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  participate	  in	  evil	  actions	  when	  under	  the	  command	  
of	  an	  authority	  figure	  (Milgram,	  1974).	  This	  is	  pertinent	  in	  that	  my	  hypothesis	  assumes	  that	  
norm	  entrepreneurs	  must	  possess	  some	  semblance	  of	  power	  in	  order	  for	  their	  norms	  to	  
experience	  the	  cascading	  effect	  necessary	  for	  them	  to	  become	  a	  part	  of	  the	  social	  fabric	  
(Finnemore,	  1998).	  Although	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  prove	  the	  efficacy	  of	  a	  norm	  entrepreneur	  to	  alter	  
group	  behavior,	  I	  discuss	  these	  studies	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  further	  link	  the	  possibility	  of	  an	  
individual	  to	  intensify	  polarized	  attitudes	  to	  such	  a	  point	  that	  genocide	  may	  occur.	  	  
Next	  I	  discuss	  the	  Rwandan	  genocide	  prior	  to	  which,	  the	  existence	  of	  norm	  
entrepreneurs	  appears	  to	  have	  been	  a	  necessary	  precursor.	  In	  Rwanda	  a	  series	  of	  
endorsements	  made	  by	  President	  Habyarimana	  clearly	  condoned	  the	  use	  of	  violence	  against	  
the	  Tutsi	  population.	  His	  lack	  of	  concern	  over	  the	  distribution	  of	  thousands	  of	  machetes	  
indicated	  that	  violence	  was	  not	  only	  the	  answer,	  it	  was	  appropriate.	  In	  fact,	  many	  political	  
figures	  sanctioned	  the	  use	  of	  violence	  against	  the	  Tutsi	  population;	  this	  allowed	  for	  a	  diffusion	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of	  responsibility	  among	  the	  Hutu	  participants.	  Much	  scholarship	  exists	  as	  to	  the	  causes	  of	  the	  
Rwandan	  genocide;	  however,	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  presence	  of	  norm	  entrepreneurs	  is	  what	  
exacerbated	  pre-­‐existing	  tension	  caused	  by	  ethnic	  disparity	  and	  food	  scarcity	  to	  a	  point	  where	  
genocide	  became	  inevitable.	  Accordingly,	  in	  his	  book	  The	  Lucifer	  Effect:	  Understanding	  How	  
Good	  People	  Turn	  Evil,	  Dr.	  Philip	  Zimbardo	  commented,	  “Human	  beings	  are	  capable	  of	  totally	  
abandoning	  their	  humanity	  for	  a	  mindless	  ideology,	  to	  follow	  and	  then	  exceed	  the	  orders	  of	  
charismatic	  authorities	  to	  destroy	  everyone	  they	  label	  as	  “The	  Enemy”	  (Zimbardo,	  2007).	  	  
Definition	  of	  Terms	  
Genocide	  seems	  easily	  identified,	  however	  time	  and	  again	  the	  UN	  has	  failed	  to	  
recognize	  its	  occurrence.	  This	  being	  the	  case,	  the	  definition	  of	  Genocide	  as	  stipulated	  by	  Article	  
2	  of	  the	  Genocide	  Convention	  is	  as	  follows:	  
“Genocide	  means	  any	  of	  the	  following	  acts	  committed	  with	  intent	  to	  destroy,	  in	  whole	  
or	  part,	  a	  national,	  ethnical,	  racial	  or	  religious	  group,	  as	  such:	  
a) Killing	  members	  of	  the	  group;	  
b) Causing	  serious	  bodily	  or	  mental	  harm	  to	  members	  of	  the	  group;	  
c) Deliberately	  inflicting	  on	  the	  group	  conditions	  of	  life	  calculated	  to	  bring	  
about	  its	  physical	  destruction	  in	  whole	  or	  in	  part;	  
d) Imposing	  measures	  intended	  to	  prevent	  births	  within	  the	  group;	  
e) Forcibly	  transferring	  children	  of	  the	  group	  to	  another	  group”	  
(Rajadhyaksha,	  2006).	  
	  
Also,	  throughout	  this	  essay	  the	  word	  ‘polarization’	  will	  be	  used	  to	  describe	  when	  in-­‐group	  
attitudes	  become	  dissimilar	  and	  oppositional	  to	  the	  out-­‐group	  such	  that	  one	  may	  consider	  the	  
other	  an	  enemy.	  Additionally,	  the	  terms	  out-­‐group	  and	  in-­‐group	  refer	  to	  groups	  united	  by	  
similar	  belief	  structures,	  cultures,	  and/or	  interests	  to	  which	  an	  individual	  may	  choose	  to	  
ascribe.	  The	  in-­‐group	  usually	  experiences	  preferential	  treatment	  for	  its	  members,	  whereas	  the	  
out-­‐group	  is	  generally	  excluded	  and	  viewed	  as	  socially	  subordinate	  to	  the	  in-­‐group.	  It	  is	  also	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necessary	  to	  define	  the	  word	  ‘norm.’	  I	  utilize	  the	  constructivist	  definition	  that,	  “considers	  
norms	  to	  be	  standards	  of	  appropriate	  behavior	  for	  actors	  with	  a	  given	  identity”	  (Hoffman,	  
2000).	  I	  study	  how	  these	  norms	  come	  to	  include	  mass	  acceptance	  of	  ethnic	  tension	  and	  
violence,	  polarizing	  attitudes	  to	  the	  point	  that	  genocide	  becomes	  a	  feasible	  option.	  
Unfortunately,	  little	  scholarship	  has	  been	  dedicated	  to	  norm	  emergence	  preceding	  genocide.	  
Currently	  debate	  centers	  on	  the	  efficacy	  of	  using	  norms	  as	  an	  explanatory	  political	  mechanism.	  	  
Considering	  the	  affect	  norms	  are	  said	  to	  have	  on	  individual	  and	  state	  behavior,	  it	  is	  essential	  
that	  academics	  first	  study	  how	  norms	  come	  about	  and	  are	  changed	  over	  time	  (Hoffman,	  2000).	  	  	  	  
	   Genocide:	  A	  Framework	   	  
Dr.	  Gregory	  Stanton	  president	  of	  Genocide	  Watch	  the	  coordinating	  organization	  of	  The	  
International	  Alliance	  to	  End	  Genocide	  (IAEG)	  puts	  forth	  a	  series	  of	  eight	  stages	  believed	  to	  be	  
indicators	  of	  genocide;	  classification,	  symbolization,	  dehumanization,	  organization,	  polarization,	  
preparation,	  extermination,	  and	  finally	  denial	  (Stanton,	  1998).	  According	  to	  Stanton,	  	  
“Genocide	  is	  a	  process	  that	  develops	  in	  eight	  stages	  that	  are	  predictable	  but	  not	  
inexorable…	  The	  process	  is	  not	  linear.	  	  Logically,	  later	  stages	  must	  be	  preceded	  
by	  earlier	  stages.	  	  But	  all	  stages	  continue	  to	  operate	  throughout	  the	  process”	  
(Stanton,	  1998).	  	  
	  
	  The	  following	  research	  intends	  to	  establish	  the	  necessary	  existence	  of	  norm	  entrepreneurs	  
during	  the	  first	  seven	  stages	  of	  genocide;	  denial	  is	  not	  included	  as	  it	  is	  not	  a	  precursor	  to	  the	  
event.	  Despite	  situational	  factors	  such	  as	  environmental	  hardship	  and/or	  systemic	  degradation,	  
a	  norm	  entrepreneur	  is	  the	  catalyst	  needed	  to	  instigate	  genocidal	  attitudes	  and	  behaviors.	  Not	  
only	  is	  the	  norm	  entrepreneur	  present	  during	  each	  of	  Stanton’s	  proposed	  stages,	  but	  his/her	  




The	  Norm	  Life	  Cycle	  
	  	   Relevant	  to	  the	  role	  of	  the	  norm	  entrepreneur	  is	  Martha	  Finnemore	  and	  Kathryn	  
Sikkink’s	  (1998)	  description	  of	  the	  norm	  life	  cycle.	  First	  is	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  norm	  through	  a,	  
“norm	  entrepreneur	  working	  from	  an	  organizational	  platform,”	  where	  he/she	  may,	  “present	  
new	  ideas	  as	  potential	  norms.”	  As	  with	  any	  entrepreneur,	  this	  individual	  is	  peddling	  his/her	  
‘social	  wares’	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  convince	  an	  audience	  of	  the	  norm’s	  validity	  and	  usefulness.	  It	  is	  
important	  that	  the	  audience	  accepts	  the	  norm	  as	  appropriate	  in	  order	  to	  see	  its	  emergence.	  
Next	  a	  norm	  experiences	  a	  cascading	  affect	  whereby	  more	  and	  more	  of	  the	  audience	  accepts	  its	  
legitimacy,	  the	  norm	  itself	  becomes	  a	  contagion	  infecting	  the	  masses.	  Lastly,	  the	  norm	  
experiences	  internalization,	  where	  the	  masses	  no	  longer	  question	  the	  norm	  but	  accept	  it	  as	  
common	  and	  every	  day	  (Finnemore,	  1998).	  Although	  this	  framework	  is	  evolutionary,	  it	  does	  not	  
necessarily	  require	  a	  prolonged	  period	  of	  exposure	  to	  the	  norm	  but	  can	  take	  a	  more	  viral	  route	  
contaminating	  the	  masses	  more	  quickly	  than	  one	  expects.	  This	  can	  occur	  when	  a	  norm	  
entrepreneur	  utilizes	  his/her	  authority	  as	  a	  means	  to	  promote	  the	  acceleration	  of	  the	  norms	  
acceptance	  among	  the	  target	  audience.	  According	  to	  the	  life	  cycle	  put	  forth	  by	  these	  authors,	  
the	  presence	  of	  a	  norm	  entrepreneur	  is	  a	  necessary	  precondition	  to	  norm	  emergence.	  In	  the	  
case	  of	  genocide,	  the	  attitudes	  held	  by	  the	  in-­‐group	  are	  simply	  internalized	  norms	  that	  promote	  











Characteristics	  and	  Tools	  of	  the	  Norm	  Entrepreneur	  
During	  genocide	  the	  role	  of	  the	  norm	  entrepreneur	  is	  to	  generate	  ethnic	  tension	  
through	  the	  creation	  and	  use	  of	  social	  norms	  that	  endorse	  the	  poor	  treatment	  and	  subsequent	  
murder	  of	  the	  out-­‐group.	  It	  is	  important	  that	  the	  norm	  entrepreneur	  possess	  certain	  attributes	  
as	  well	  as	  utilize	  specific	  tools	  at	  his/her	  disposal	  in	  order	  to	  alter	  in-­‐group	  behavior.	  At	  the	  
least,	  a	  norm	  entrepreneur	  has	  to	  possess	  the	  appearance	  of	  authority	  as	  it	  allows	  the	  in-­‐group	  
to	  diffuse	  responsibility	  among	  themselves	  for	  their	  murderous	  actions.	  Naturally,	  the	  desires	  
of	  the	  authority	  carry	  a	  commanding	  quality	  as	  the	  idea	  of	  obedience	  has	  long	  been	  ingrained	  
within	  human	  behavior.	  Consider	  the	  average	  individual,	  first	  he/she	  is	  expected	  to	  be	  
subservient	  to	  his/her	  parents,	  then	  to	  educational	  figures	  and	  his/her	  boss	  in	  a	  given	  
profession,	  and	  finally	  to	  the	  social/societal	  order	  that	  is	  both	  systems	  and	  institutions.	  Each	  
person	  has	  been	  indoctrinated	  to	  follow	  some	  type	  of	  rule	  that	  has	  been	  established	  and	  
maintained	  by	  someone	  else.	  In	  essence,	  obedience	  to	  authority	  has	  become	  a	  social	  norm.	  In	  
the	  following	  studies,	  participant	  responses	  will	  support	  the	  idea	  that	  a	  diffusion	  of	  
responsibility	  is	  experienced	  when	  an	  abusive	  action	  is	  perpetrated	  at	  the	  request	  of	  an	  
authority	  figure.	  	  
One	  may	  also	  imagine	  the	  effect	  that	  disobeying	  rules	  can	  have	  on	  an	  individual.	  Later,	  
Milgram’s	  study	  on	  obedience	  will	  help	  to	  explain	  the	  lengths	  an	  ordinary	  person	  will	  go	  to	  
fulfill	  an	  order.	  Moreover,	  the	  norm	  entrepreneur	  possesses	  the	  ability	  to	  force	  compliance	  to	  
such	  commands.	  Coupled	  with	  the	  desire	  to	  be	  obedient	  is	  the	  individual’s	  fear	  of	  being	  
disobedient.	  While	  some	  participated	  out	  of	  a	  distorted	  and	  morbid	  sense	  of	  compliance,	  
others	  took	  part	  because	  there	  was	  no	  alternative,	  “anyone	  who	  hesitated	  to	  kill	  because	  of	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feelings	  of	  sadness	  absolutely	  had	  to	  watch	  his	  mouth,	  to	  say	  nothing	  about	  the	  reason	  for	  his	  
reticence,	  for	  fear	  of	  being	  accused	  of	  complicity”	  (Zimbardo,	  2007).	  Essentially,	  participants	  in	  
the	  genocide	  had	  to	  make	  a	  choice	  between	  the	  lesser	  of	  two	  evils,	  kill	  or	  be	  killed.	  	  
Anonymity	  may	  be	  one	  of	  the	  largest	  predictors	  of	  aggressive	  or	  inappropriate	  behavior.	  
Many	  studies	  have	  been	  conducted	  on	  the	  affect	  anonymity	  has	  upon	  group	  and	  individual	  
behavior.	  The	  absence	  of	  the	  ability	  to	  be	  identified	  allows	  for	  the	  emergence	  of	  otherwise	  
unordinary	  behaviors.	  This	  is	  coupled	  with	  the	  idea	  that	  anonymity	  leads	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  
consequence,	  as	  the	  criminal	  cannot	  be	  held	  accountable	  for	  his/her	  actions.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  
genocide,	  there	  is	  a	  both	  a	  lack	  of	  consequence	  for	  murderous	  acts	  and	  a	  sense	  of	  
deindividuation.	  This	  concept	  is	  easily	  applicable	  to	  both	  the	  in-­‐group	  and	  out-­‐group,	  as	  
members	  are	  seen	  as	  being	  interchangeable	  or	  lacking	  in	  individual	  distinctness	  from	  one	  
another.	  	  When	  a	  Hutu	  murdered,	  the	  victim	  was	  no	  longer	  recognized	  as	  an	  individual	  but	  
rather	  a	  part	  of	  the	  Tutsi	  ‘problem.’	  	  Persons	  within	  each	  of	  the	  groups	  began	  to	  relate	  more	  to	  
the	  whole	  of	  the	  collection	  rather	  than	  maintain	  their	  individuality.	  The	  role	  norm	  
entrepreneurs	  play	  in	  the	  materialization	  of	  anonymity	  is	  often	  their	  arbitrary	  creation	  of	  in-­‐
groups	  and	  out-­‐groups.	  Reiteration	  of	  group	  distinctness	  solidifies	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  individual	  is	  
merely	  a	  part	  of	  the	  crowd.	  Norm	  entrepreneurs	  often	  utilize	  hate	  speech	  as	  a	  means	  to	  create	  
such	  feelings	  of	  deindividuation	  and	  ethnocentrism.	  	  	  
Most	  genocide	  is	  prefaced	  by	  organized	  hate	  campaigns;	  a	  key	  aspect	  of	  which	  is	  the	  
creation	  of	  the	  “scapegoat”	  as	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  create	  an	  Us	  vs.	  Them	  mentality.	  Mass	  
frustration	  creates	  an	  atmosphere	  in	  which	  scapegoating	  can	  arise.	  Perceived	  visible	  and/or	  
conceptual	  differences	  such	  as	  height,	  skin	  color,	  career	  choice,	  ancestral	  lineage,	  and	  level	  of	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education,	  quickly	  become	  clearly	  demarcated	  lines	  across	  which	  ethnic	  groups	  align.	  As	  a	  
political	  maneuver,	  the	  introduction	  of	  a	  scapegoat	  is	  welcomed	  as	  the	  ultimate	  cause	  for	  
perceived	  ‘hard	  times’	  (Zvagulis,	  2010).	  This	  however	  proves	  cyclical	  as	  the	  annihilation	  of	  one	  
scapegoat	  creates	  a	  void	  in	  which	  another	  must	  arise.	  This	  ‘solution’	  seems	  as	  ridiculous	  as	  it	  is	  
impractical.	  As	  a	  cure-­‐all,	  it	  is	  ineffectual	  as	  all	  the	  problems	  that	  existed	  prior	  were	  never	  fully	  
addressed.	  Often	  the	  norm	  entrepreneur	  introduces	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  scapegoat	  through	  the	  use	  of	  
hate	  speech	  and/or	  the	  distribution	  of	  hate	  propaganda.	   	  
Furthermore,	  the	  goal	  of	  the	  norm	  entrepreneur	  is	  to	  dehumanize	  and	  demonize	  the	  
out-­‐group	  as	  a	  means	  to	  polarize	  attitudes.	  Evidence	  of	  the	  power	  of	  the	  norm	  entrepreneur	  is	  
embodied	  in	  his/her	  ability	  to	  both	  utilize	  and	  promote	  hate	  speech.	  Within	  such	  speech	  the	  
norm	  entrepreneur	  creates	  a	  set	  of	  rules	  or	  norms	  that	  are	  then	  used	  to	  frame	  the	  actions	  and	  
attitudes	  of	  individuals.	  A	  common	  tactic	  employed	  by	  the	  norm	  entrepreneur	  is	  to	  generate	  
euphemistic	  terms	  for	  seemingly	  aggressive,	  inappropriate	  language	  utilized	  during	  their	  hate	  
campaign.	  Examples	  would	  include	  the	  Habyarimana	  Regime’s	  use	  of	  the	  word	  ‘solution’	  to	  
refer	  to	  the	  extermination	  of	  the	  Tutsi	  (Hatzfeld,	  2005).	  This	  method	  keeps	  negatively	  
connotative	  words	  and	  phrases	  from	  distracting	  the	  in-­‐group	  from	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  hate	  
campaign.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  the	  necessity	  to	  adapt,	  those	  who	  may	  have	  in	  ordinary	  circumstances	  
objected	  to	  such	  aggressive	  actions,	  instead	  participate	  in	  the	  dehumanization	  of	  the	  out-­‐group	  
as	  a	  means	  to,	  “suspend	  his	  or	  her	  usual	  emotional	  response	  in	  an	  emergency,	  a	  crisis,	  or	  a	  
work	  situation	  that	  demands	  invading	  the	  privacy	  of	  others”	  (Zimbardo,	  2007).	  As	  an	  aspect	  of	  
hate	  speech	  the	  norm	  entrepreneur	  also	  promotes	  ethnocentrism	  among	  the	  in-­‐group	  as	  a	  
means	  to	  draw	  the	  group	  together,	  encouraging	  the	  in-­‐group	  to	  act	  as	  one.	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Research	  Studies:	  The	  Ability	  of	  the	  Norm	  Entrepreneur	  to	  Affect	  Group	  Behavior	  
Diary	  of	  an	  Abandoned	  Automobile	  
“Internalized	  anonymity	  needs	  no	  darkness	  for	  its	  expression”	  (Zimbardo,	  2007)	  
	  
Introduction	  and	  Methods	  
	  
If	  a	  norm	  entrepreneur	  is	  to	  be	  considered	  a	  primary	  cause	  of	  genocide	  than	  his/her	  
ability	  to	  affect	  group	  behavior	  must	  be	  discussed.	  What	  follow	  are	  a	  series	  of	  studies	  that	  
when	  taken	  cumulatively	  speak	  to	  the	  ability	  of	  individuals	  to	  affect	  group	  behavior	  to	  the	  point	  
that	  genocide	  may	  occur.	  To	  begin,	  Dr.	  Philip	  Zimbardo	  orchestrated	  an	  observational	  study	  
titled,	  Diary	  of	  an	  Abandoned	  Automobile	  in	  which	  a	  car	  of	  similar	  make	  and	  model	  was	  left	  
‘abandoned’	  across	  the	  street	  from	  each	  of	  the	  city’s	  respective	  college	  campuses.	  The	  vehicles	  
were	  left	  with	  their	  hoods	  open	  and	  their	  plates	  removed.	  As	  a	  result,	  ordinary	  people	  did	  
unordinary	  things.	  	  
Results	  and	  Implications	  
There	  were	  differences	  in	  the	  results	  between	  the	  two	  locations.	  Over	  the	  course	  of	  a	  
few	  days	  the	  Bronx	  vehicle	  was	  entirely	  stripped	  and	  had	  experienced,	  “23	  separate	  destructive	  
incidents,”	  all	  of	  which	  occurred	  in	  broad	  daylight.	  In	  comparison,	  there	  was	  not	  one	  act	  of	  
vandalism	  perpetrated	  upon	  the	  Palo	  Alto	  vehicle	  (Zimbardo,	  2007).	  
“The	  message	  of	  this	  little	  demonstration	  is	  that	  conditions	  that	  make	  us	  feel	  
anonymous,	  when	  we	  think	  that	  others	  do	  not	  know	  us	  or	  care	  to,	  can	  foster	  
antisocial,	  self-­‐interested	  behaviors”	  (Zimbardo,	  2007).	  	  
	  
According	  to	  Zimbardo	  the	  vandals	  were	  “…adults	  who,	  under	  other	  circumstances,	  might	  
demand	  more	  police	  protection	  and	  less	  coddling	  of	  criminals	  and	  would	  ‘very	  definitely	  agree’	  
with	  the	  opinion	  poll	  item	  about	  the	  necessity	  for	  more	  law	  and	  order”	  (Zimbardo,	  2007).	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Zimbardo’s	  reasoning	  for	  the	  geographical	  inconsistency	  had	  to	  do	  with	  the	  idea	  that	  
anonymity	  was	  near	  impossible	  in	  Palo	  Alto.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  findings	  from	  this	  study	  may	  be	  
relevant	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  norm	  entrepreneur	  as	  they	  support	  the	  argument	  that	  
anonymity	  can	  aid	  in	  the	  emergence	  of	  evil	  behavior.	  Inherent	  in	  the	  concept	  of	  anonymity	  is	  
also	  knowledge	  of	  a	  lack	  of	  consequence.	  If	  one	  cannot	  be	  singled	  out	  as	  having	  committed	  a	  
criminal	  act,	  than	  one	  cannot	  be	  punished.	  Leading	  up	  to	  and	  during	  the	  Rwandan	  genocide,	  
norm	  entrepreneurs	  exacerbated	  feelings	  of	  anonymity	  thereby	  contributing	  to	  an	  environment	  
that	  was	  conducive	  to	  the	  materialization	  of	  evil	  behavior.	  	  
Stanford	  Prison	  Experiment	  
Introduction	  and	  Methods	  
No	  study	  clearly	  indicates	  the	  manipulative	  capabilities	  of	  authority	  than	  in	  the	  case	  of	  
Dr.	  Philip	  Zimbardo’s	  Stanford	  Prison	  Experiment	  (SPE).	  Zimbardo	  was	  interested	  in	  studying	  
what	  he	  coined	  the	  Lucifer	  Effect,	  “The	  Lucifer	  Effect	  is	  my	  attempt	  to	  understand	  the	  
processes	  of	  transformation	  at	  work	  when	  good	  or	  ordinary	  people	  do	  bad	  or	  evil	  things”	  
(Zimbardo,	  2007).	  The	  SPE	  was	  set	  up	  to	  mimic	  an	  actual	  prison	  environment.	  College	  students	  
volunteered	  and	  were	  randomly	  selected	  to	  act	  out	  the	  role	  of	  either	  prisoner	  or	  guard.	  The	  
volunteers	  were	  then	  placed	  in	  a	  mock	  ‘prison’	  where	  they	  were	  meant	  to	  live	  and	  work	  over	  
the	  course	  of	  two	  weeks.	  Within	  a	  day,	  the	  guards	  began	  to	  abuse	  the	  prisoners.	  Previous	  
studies	  had	  established	  that	  deindividuated	  persons	  more	  readily	  participated	  in	  violence	  
against	  others	  in	  comparison	  to	  those	  who	  were	  individuated.	  In	  other	  words,	  although	  the	  
groups	  were	  made	  rather	  arbitrarily,	  the	  mere	  classification	  between	  guards	  and	  prisoners	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created	  an	  ‘Us	  vs.	  Them’	  mentality.	  The	  cohesion	  that	  each	  group	  began	  to	  feel	  and	  would	  later	  
act	  upon	  is	  similar	  to	  group	  cohesion	  brought	  on	  during	  instances	  of	  genocide.	  	  
Results	  and	  Implications	   	  	  
The	  results	  of	  this	  study	  demonstrate	  how	  feelings	  of	  anonymity	  can	  lead	  to	  the	  
emergence	  of	  evil	  and	  often	  violent	  behaviors.	  The	  group’s	  participants	  were	  deindividuated	  
and	  as	  the	  experiment	  suggests,	  this	  left	  them	  more	  susceptible	  to	  their	  environment	  and	  more	  
likely	  to	  participate	  in	  aggressive	  behaviors.	  The	  guards	  began	  by	  instilling	  a	  set	  of	  rules	  meant	  
to	  restrict	  the	  freedom	  of	  the	  prisoners.	  	  These	  rules	  would	  later	  become	  a	  set	  of	  torturous	  
norms.	  Punishment	  for	  non-­‐compliance	  consisted	  of	  a	  stint	  in	  the	  “hole,”	  a	  dark	  closeted	  space	  
in	  which	  there	  was	  barely	  enough	  room	  to	  stand.	  Rules	  stipulating	  the	  maximum	  number	  of	  
hours	  a	  prisoner	  could	  spend	  in	  the	  hole	  were	  repeatedly	  ignored.	  One	  guard	  recalls	  “I	  saw	  the	  
guards	  as	  a	  group	  of	  pleasant	  guys	  charged	  with	  the	  necessity	  of	  maintaining	  order	  among	  a	  
group	  of	  persons	  unworthy	  of	  trust	  or	  sympathy	  –the	  prisoners”	  (Zimbardo,	  2007).	  The	  guards,	  
like	  the	  murderers	  in	  Rwanda,	  internalized	  their	  roles	  until	  it	  became	  a	  part	  of	  their	  identity.	  
“As	  I	  got	  angrier	  and	  angrier,	  I	  didn’t	  question	  this	  behavior	  as	  much.	  I	  couldn’t	  let	  it	  affect	  me,	  
so	  I	  started	  hiding	  myself	  deeper	  behind	  my	  role.	  It	  was	  the	  only	  way	  of	  not	  hurting	  yourself.	  I	  
was	  really	  lost	  on	  what	  was	  happening	  but	  didn’t	  even	  think	  about	  quitting”	  (Zimbardo,	  2007).	  
Zimbardo	  commented,	  “role	  playing	  has	  become	  role	  internalization;	  the	  actors	  have	  assumed	  
the	  characters	  and	  identities	  of	  their	  fictional	  roles”	  (Zimbardo,	  2007).	  
The	  guards	  began	  to	  seek	  out	  reasons	  for	  their	  dislike	  of	  the	  prisoners	  as	  a	  means	  to	  
rationalize	  their	  continued	  abuse.	  Justification	  for	  their	  mistreatment	  was	  often	  a	  result	  of	  the	  
prisoner’s	  unsanitary	  living	  conditions;	  of	  which,	  the	  guards	  were	  the	  cause.	  For	  example,	  the	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guards	  repeatedly	  restricted	  access	  to	  sanitation	  facilities	  and	  as	  punishment	  required	  that	  the	  
prisoners	  clean	  out	  the	  toilets	  with	  their	  bare	  hands.	  One	  guard	  recollects,	  “I	  got	  tired	  of	  seeing	  
the	  prisoners	  in	  rags,	  smelling	  bad,	  and	  the	  prison	  stink”	  (Zimbardo,	  2007).	  This	  is	  indicative	  of	  
genocide	  during	  which	  the	  in-­‐group	  begins	  to	  blame	  the	  out-­‐group	  for	  its	  sorry	  condition	  which	  
is	  often	  a	  result	  of	  their	  harsh	  treatment	  by	  the	  in-­‐group.	  As	  with	  any	  war,	  the	  in-­‐group	  has	  to	  
disassociate	  itself	  from	  the	  out-­‐group	  so	  as	  to	  keep	  from	  feeling	  guilty	  for	  their	  actions.	  Some	  
guards	  mentioned,	  “there	  were	  a	  few	  times	  when	  I	  had	  forgotten	  the	  prisoners	  were	  
people…Also	  I	  [made]	  an	  actual	  try	  of	  my	  will	  to	  dehumanize	  them	  in	  order	  to	  make	  it	  easy	  for	  
me”	  (Zimbardo,	  2007).	  	  
Dr.	  Zimbardo	  set	  up	  a	  situation	  and	  established	  norms	  that	  inevitably	  led	  to	  this	  
disturbing	  scenario.	  Systems	  of	  power	  are	  ever	  prevalent	  “institutions	  create	  mechanisms	  that	  
translate	  ideology	  into	  operating	  procedures.”	  The	  men	  and	  women	  with	  this	  perceived	  power	  
are	  as	  instrumental	  to	  the	  behavior	  of	  the	  masses	  with	  their	  inaction	  as	  they	  are	  with	  their	  
action.	  The	  implications	  of	  this	  study	  are	  that	  given	  the	  right	  parameters,	  groups	  will	  polarize	  to	  
the	  point	  where	  abuse	  of	  an	  out-­‐group	  will	  occur.	  Sadly,	  this	  study	  was	  cut	  short	  due	  to	  the	  
abhorrent	  events	  that	  transpired	  in	  as	  little	  as	  five	  days	  time.	  In	  fact,	  what	  was	  experienced	  
during	  the	  SPE	  is	  strikingly	  similar	  to	  those	  atrocities	  photographically	  documented	  at	  Abu	  
Ghraib.	  The	  participants	  were	  everyday	  male	  college	  students	  that	  had	  tested	  well	  within	  the	  
normal	  range	  in	  a	  series	  of	  psychological	  assessments	  administered	  prior	  to	  the	  experiment.	  
However,	  the	  environment	  that	  was	  created	  lent	  itself	  to	  the	  evolution	  of	  abusive	  behaviors.	  
Zimbardo,	  as	  the	  creator	  of	  the	  experiment,	  played	  the	  role	  of	  norm	  entrepreneur	  and	  




Jane	  Elliott’s	  Brown-­‐Eyed,	  Blue-­‐Eyed	  Experiment	  
Introduction	  and	  Methods	   	  
Another	  equally	  compelling	  study	  was	  conducted	  by	  Jane	  Elliott,	  a	  3rd	  grade	  elementary	  
school	  teacher.	  Her	  intent	  was	  to	  make	  real	  the	  problem	  of	  segregation	  and	  the	  affects	  racial	  
subjugation	  had	  on	  African	  Americans.	  The	  study	  itself	  was	  conducted	  the	  day	  after	  Martin	  
Luther	  King.	  Jr.	  was	  assassinated,	  April	  5,	  1968.	  On	  that	  day,	  Elliot	  arbitrarily	  assigned	  the	  
children	  in	  her	  class	  to	  groups	  based	  upon	  the	  color	  of	  their	  eyes;	  she	  then	  established	  an	  in-­‐
group	  of	  ‘blue-­‐eyed	  children’	  and	  an	  out-­‐group	  of	  ‘brown-­‐eyed	  children.’	  Next	  Jane	  Elliott	  
informed	  her	  class	  of	  the	  parameters	  of	  the	  study;	  
“The	  brown-­‐eyed	  people	  do	  not	  get	  to	  use	  the	  drinking	  fountain.	  You’ll	  have	  to	  
use	  the	  paper	  cups.	  You	  brown-­‐eyed	  people	  are	  not	  to	  play	  with	  blue-­‐eyed	  
people	  on	  the	  playground,	  because	  you	  are	  not	  as	  good	  as	  blue-­‐eyed	  people.	  The	  
brown-­‐eyed	  people	  in	  the	  room	  today	  are	  going	  to	  wear	  collars.	  So	  that	  we	  can	  
tell	  from	  a	  distance	  what	  color	  your	  eyes	  are.	  Blue-­‐eyed	  people	  are	  smarter	  than	  
brown-­‐eyed	  people.	  They	  are	  cleaner	  than	  brown-­‐eyed	  people.	  They	  are	  more	  
civilized	  than	  brown-­‐eyed	  people”	  (Eye	  of	  the	  Storm,	  1985).	  
	  	  
This	  excerpt	  is	  indicative	  of	  how	  the	  day	  went.	  The	  following	  day,	  Mrs.	  Elliott	  switched	  the	  roles	  
of	  the	  groups.	  A	  video	  documentation	  of	  the	  results	  was	  recorded	  entitled,	  “A	  Class	  Divided”	  
which	  was	  produced	  and	  directed	  by	  William	  Peters,	  the	  journalist	  who	  first	  ran	  the	  story	  in	  
1970	  for	  ABC.	  
Results	  and	  Implications	  
This	  study	  emphasized	  the	  power	  of	  groupthink	  and	  the	  affect	  of	  the	  unfair	  creation	  of	  
groups	  on	  both	  in-­‐group	  and	  out-­‐group	  attitudes.	  Soon	  the	  supposedly	  more	  superior	  blue-­‐
eyed	  children	  were	  dehumanizing	  the	  brown-­‐eyed	  children,	  turning	  the	  term	  ‘brown	  eyes’	  into	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a	  derogatory	  descriptor	  for	  the	  members	  of	  the	  out-­‐group,	  “John:	  Russell	  called	  me	  names	  and	  
I	  hit	  him…	  Jane	  Elliott:	  What	  did	  he	  call	  you?	  John:	  Brown	  eyes”	  (Eye	  of	  the	  Storm,	  1985).	  The	  
rapidity	  with	  which	  the	  children	  began	  to	  associate	  the	  negative	  characteristics	  with	  the	  
proposed	  out-­‐group	  is	  astounding.	  For	  example,	  when	  asked	  why	  the	  brown-­‐eyed	  children	  
were	  not	  allowed	  to	  go	  back	  for	  seconds	  during	  lunch	  the	  blue-­‐eyed	  children	  responded,	  
“They’re	  not	  smart…[We’re]	  afraid	  they’ll	  take	  too	  much”	  (Eye	  of	  the	  Storm,	  1985).	  Similarly,	  
when	  asked	  what	  was	  wrong	  with	  being	  called	  brown-­‐eyes	  a	  child	  responded,	  “It	  means	  that	  
we’re	  stupider”	  (Eye	  of	  the	  Storm,	  1985).	  Such	  distinctions	  were	  readily	  assimilated	  by	  the	  
children	  and	  the	  groups	  began	  to	  take	  on	  the	  attributes	  that	  Jane	  Elliott,	  as	  the	  norm	  
entrepreneur,	  had	  introduced.	  	  
An	  interesting	  outcome	  of	  the	  experiment	  was	  seen	  when	  the	  children	  were	  
administered	  a	  phonics	  test,	  	  
“I	  use	  phonics.	  We	  use	  the	  card	  pack,	  and	  the	  children,	  the	  brown-­‐eyed	  children	  
were	  in	  the	  low	  class	  the	  first	  day	  and	  it	  took	  them	  five	  and	  a	  half	  minutes	  to	  get	  
through	  the	  card	  pack.	  The	  second	  day	  it	  took	  them	  two	  and	  a	  half	  minutes.	  The	  
only	  thing	  that	  had	  changed	  was	  the	  fact	  that	  now	  they	  were	  superior	  people”	  
(Eye	  of	  the	  Storm,	  1985).	  
	  
These	  results	  demonstrate	  that	  dehumanization	  may	  be	  a	  self-­‐fulfilling	  prophecy	  whereby	  the	  
out-­‐group	  begins	  to	  assimilate	  the	  role	  of	  a	  less	  than	  superior	  people;	  this	  is	  turn	  validates	  the	  
negative	  opinions	  held	  by	  the	  in-­‐group	  towards	  the	  out-­‐group.	  This	  study	  emphasizes	  how	  
polarized	  an	  atmosphere	  can	  become	  with	  even	  the	  most	  arbitrary	  creation	  of	  an	  in-­‐group	  and	  
out-­‐group	  (Eye	  of	  the	  Storm,	  1970).	  This	  argument	  is	  further	  supported	  by	  research	  conducted	  
by	  Taijfel	  (1982)	  and	  Turner	  (1987)	  which	  concluded	  that,	  “the	  mere	  categorization	  of	  people	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into	  groups	  can	  lead	  to	  favoritism	  toward	  the	  in-­‐group	  and	  discrimination	  against	  the	  out-­‐group	  
in	  order	  to	  maintain	  a	  positive	  social	  identity”	  (Taijfel,	  1982;	  Turner,	  1987;	  Leets,	  2002).	  	  	  
“I	  watched	  what	  had	  been	  marvelous,	  cooperative,	  wonderful,	  thoughtful	  
children	  turn	  into	  nasty,	  vicious,	  discriminating,	  little	  third-­‐graders	  in	  a	  space	  of	  
fifteen	  minutes”	  (Eye	  of	  the	  Storm,	  1985)	  
-­‐Jane	  Elliott	  on	  the	  transformative	  nature	  of	  her	  experiment.	  	  
	  
Stanley	  Milgram’s	  Experiment	  on	  Obedience	  
Introduction	  and	  Methods	   	  
Dr.	  Milgram’s	  intentions	  were	  to	  research	  the	  affect	  of	  authority	  on	  obedience.	  He	  
began	  by	  running	  an	  advertisement	  in	  the	  newspaper	  asking	  for	  volunteers	  drawn	  from	  the	  
local	  population.	  Those	  who	  responded	  were	  paired	  with	  an	  actor	  provided	  by	  the	  researchers.	  
The	  respondent	  was	  unaware	  that	  his/her	  pairing	  was	  planned	  and	  assumed	  the	  other	  
participant	  was	  as	  naive	  to	  the	  proceedings	  as	  he/she	  was.	  Upon	  arriving,	  the	  respondent	  was	  
led	  to	  believe	  that	  he/she	  was	  randomly	  selected	  to	  play	  the	  role	  of	  ‘teacher’	  in	  the	  
experiment.	  The	  implanted	  participant	  was	  given	  the	  role	  of	  ‘learner.’	  The	  teacher	  was	  under	  
the	  impression	  that	  the	  experiment	  was	  to	  study	  the	  effects	  punishment	  had	  on	  how	  a	  person	  
comes	  to	  learn.	  The	  study	  required	  that	  the	  teacher	  induce	  shocks	  for	  incorrect	  answers	  given	  
by	  the	  learner	  in	  response	  to	  a	  predetermined	  set	  of	  questions.	  However,	  what	  the	  
experimenters	  were	  more	  interested	  in	  was	  whether	  a	  person	  would	  obey	  when	  commands	  
from	  an	  authority	  figure	  ran	  contrary	  to	  the	  participant’s	  moral	  conscience	  (Milgram,	  1974).	  
The	  intentions	  of	  the	  study	  were	  to	  decipher	  how	  everyday	  individuals	  came	  to	  participate	  in	  
the	  murder	  of	  the	  Jews	  during	  the	  Holocaust.	  The	  premise	  assumed	  that	  the	  teacher	  would	  
respond	  to	  an	  authority	  figure	  such	  that	  they	  would	  increase	  the	  voltage	  delivered	  to	  the	  
learner	  to	  the	  point	  of	  abuse	  (Milgram,	  1974).	  The	  reactions	  of	  the	  learner	  were	  structured	  to	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create	  a	  basis	  for	  measure;	  for	  instance,	  at	  285	  volts	  the	  learner	  was	  instructed	  to	  make	  an	  
“agonized	  scream”	  (Milgram,	  1974).	  Also	  important	  was	  that	  the	  learner	  was	  strapped	  down	  to	  
the	  chair	  so	  that	  he	  could	  not	  escape	  the	  shocks	  without	  the	  aid	  of	  the	  researcher.	  Results	  were	  
tabulated	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  situational	  circumstances.	   	  
Results	  and	  Implications	  
Over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  experiments	  an	  unnerving	  number	  of	  participants,	  almost	  2/3,	  
continued	  to	  obey	  the	  requests	  made	  by	  the	  researcher	  regardless	  of	  perceived	  resistance	  by	  
the	  learner	  (Milgram,	  1974).	  Although	  the	  pressure	  for	  disobedience	  mounted,	  participants	  
continued	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  requests	  of	  the	  authority	  figure.	  Even	  some	  of	  the	  strongest	  
protests	  were	  met	  with	  total	  obedience.	  Many	  participants	  shocked	  the	  learner	  until	  the	  
researcher	  concluded	  the	  experiment,	  administering	  shocks	  that	  would	  have	  proven	  fatal	  to	  the	  
learner	  had	  they	  been	  real	  (Milgram,	  1974).	  	  
	   At	  the	  culmination	  of	  the	  shock	  experiment,	  the	  teachers	  were	  asked	  questions	  
regarding	  their	  participation.	  Their	  responses	  proved	  extremely	  telling	  of	  the	  power	  of	  
authority.	  One	  respondent,	  when	  asked	  who	  was	  at	  fault	  had	  the	  learner	  been	  hurt	  responded	  
“I	  say	  your	  fault	  for	  the	  simple	  reason	  that	  I	  was	  paid	  for	  doing	  this.	  I	  had	  to	  follow	  orders.	  
That’s	  how	  I	  figured	  it.”	  The	  researcher	  observed,	  “obedient	  subject	  asserts	  that	  he	  had	  no	  
autonomy	  in	  the	  matter	  of	  shocking	  the	  victim	  and	  that	  his	  actions	  were	  completely	  out	  of	  his	  
own	  hands”	  (Milgram,	  1974).	  The	  ‘teacher’	  exuded	  a	  lack	  of	  responsibility	  for	  their	  own	  actions.	  
Participants	  voiced	  concern	  at	  continuing	  the	  experiment	  but	  still	  they	  were	  obedient,	  	  
“…I	  had	  about	  eight	  more	  levels	  to	  pull	  and	  he	  [the	  learner]	  was	  really	  hysterical	  
in	  there	  and	  he	  was	  going	  to	  get	  the	  police,	  and	  what	  not.	  So	  I	  called	  the	  
professor	  three	  times.	  And	  the	  third	  time	  he	  said,	  ‘Just	  continue,’	  so	  I	  give	  him	  
the	  next	  jolt.	  And	  then	  I	  don’t	  hear	  no	  more	  answer	  from	  him,	  not	  a	  whimper	  or	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anything.	  I	  said,	  ;Good	  God,	  he’s	  dead;	  well,	  here	  we	  go,	  we’ll	  finish	  him,	  And	  I	  
just	  continued	  all	  the	  way	  through	  to	  450	  volts”	  (Milgram,	  1975).	  
	  
Results	  suggest	  that	  it	  was	  merely	  the	  presence	  of	  authority	  that	  gave	  the	  requests	  such	  a	  
commanding	  quality.	  When	  asked	  if	  he	  had	  been	  bothered	  by	  his	  having	  to	  administer	  the	  
shocks	  this	  same	  participant	  replied,	  	  
“No…I	  figured:	  well,	  this	  is	  an	  experiment,	  and	  Yale	  knows	  what’s	  going	  on,	  and	  if	  
they	  think	  it’s	  all	  right,	  well,	  it’s	  all	  right	  with	  me.	  They	  know	  more	  than	  I	  do…I’ll	  
go	  through	  with	  anything	  they	  tell	  me	  to	  do”	  (Milgram,	  1975).	  
	  
The	  fact	  that	  the	  study	  was	  associated	  with	  Yale	  University	  lent	  the	  researchers	  an	  appearance	  
of	  authority	  and	  superior	  knowledge.	  The	  results	  indicated	  that	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  requesting	  
authority	  figure	  was	  necessary	  to	  the	  administration	  of	  increased	  shocks,	  as	  when	  offered	  the	  
opportunity	  to	  choose	  the	  level	  of	  shock,	  most	  participants	  rarely	  went	  above	  the	  lowest	  of	  
levels.	  Even	  rarer	  were	  those	  participants	  that	  traversed	  the	  entirety	  of	  the	  scale.	  Still,	  those	  
who	  showed	  extreme	  confidence	  in	  their	  inability	  to	  punish	  or	  hurt	  continued	  to	  shock	  the	  
learner	  when	  commanded	  by	  an	  authority	  figure.	  	  
	   The	  relevance	  of	  this	  study	  to	  the	  role	  of	  the	  norm	  entrepreneur	  is	  that	  an	  individual	  
with	  the	  appearance	  of	  authority	  may	  induce	  responses	  similar	  to	  those	  seen	  in	  this	  
experiment.	  Ordinary	  citizens	  administered	  fatal	  shocks	  in	  the	  face	  of	  obvious	  distress	  at	  the	  
request	  of	  an	  authority	  figure.	  Not	  only	  did	  participants	  voice	  a	  sense	  of	  duty,	  but	  they	  also	  
indicated	  a	  diffusion	  of	  responsibility	  for	  their	  actions.	  Also,	  the	  perceived	  consequences	  for	  
their	  disobedience,	  i.e.	  return	  of	  payment	  for	  services	  rendered,	  was	  enough	  to	  encourage	  their	  
participation	  to	  the	  point	  of	  learner	  distress.	  These	  responses	  are	  strikingly	  similar	  to	  those	  





Mathew	  Hoffman:	  Exploring	  Norm	  Emergence	  and	  Evolution	  
Introduction	  and	  Methods	  
Hoffman’s	  study	  is	  evidence	  of	  the	  ability	  of	  a	  norm	  entrepreneur	  to	  alter	  group	  
behavior.	  The	  study	  was	  set	  up	  so	  that	  participants	  were	  asked	  to	  pick	  a	  number	  between	  0	  and	  
100,	  “and	  the	  ‘winners’	  [were]	  those	  closest	  to	  the	  average	  ‘pick’	  from	  the	  whole	  population”	  
(Hoffman,	  2000).	  Each	  simulation	  included	  10	  participants.	  Those	  participants	  were	  asked	  to	  
base	  their	  decision	  on	  what	  they	  believed	  would	  be	  the	  average	  choice	  among	  all	  other	  
participants	  in	  their	  simulation.	  Prior	  to	  their	  choosing,	  participants	  were	  instructed	  to	  use	  
three	  out	  of	  seven	  rules	  provided	  to	  them	  to	  aid	  in	  their	  prediction.	  The	  participant	  then	  made	  
three	  predictions	  based	  upon	  each	  of	  the	  three	  rules	  they	  had	  chosen.	  Then	  the	  agent	  
presented	  her	  choices	  to	  the	  whole	  population.	  The	  outcome	  of	  the	  experiment	  was	  an	  average	  
of	  these	  numbers	  across	  the	  entire	  population	  with	  an	  addition	  of	  noise.	  ‘Noise’	  is	  an	  
intervening	  variable	  that	  accounts	  for	  any	  confounding	  factors	  that	  may	  affect	  the	  outcome	  of	  
the	  experiment.	  Correct	  responses	  were	  rewarded	  and	  incorrect	  responses	  were	  punished,	  
establishing	  an	  expectation	  that	  most	  closely	  resembles	  a	  community	  norm.	  	  
The	  study	  assumed	  the	  following:	  
1) Agent	  actions	  (or	  predictions	  in	  this	  model)	  are	  driven	  by	  internal	  models	  or	  
hypotheses—the	  rules	  available	  to	  the	  agents.	  
2) Agents	  have	  finite	  calculation	  capabilities—they	  can	  only	  ‘follow’	  the	  possible	  
implications	  of	  a	  few	  rules	  at	  a	  time.	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3) Agents	  are	  goal	  seekers—they	  have	  a	  built	  in	  desire	  to	  match	  their	  predictions	  
with	  the	  outcome.	  
4) Agents	  are	  adaptive—they	  change	  their	  active	  rule	  when	  it	  ceases	  to	  allow	  them	  
to	  meet	  their	  goal	  and	  they	  keep	  it	  when	  it	  performs	  well.	  (Hoffman,	  2000)	  
In	  the	  study	  there	  were	  seven	  rules	  from	  which	  the	  agents	  could	  choose	  to	  determine	  their	  
predictions.	  
1) Pick	  a	  random	  number	  between	  0	  and	  10.	  
2) Pick	  a	  random	  number	  between	  15	  and	  25.	  
3) Pick	  a	  random	  number	  between	  30	  and	  40.	  
4) Pick	  a	  random	  number	  between	  45	  and	  55.43	  
5) Pick	  a	  random	  number	  between	  60	  and	  70.	  
6) Pick	  a	  random	  number	  between	  75	  and	  85.	  
7) Pick	  a	  random	  number	  between	  90	  and	  100.	  
“Each	  of	  the	  rules	  is	  a	  hypothesis	  or	  prediction	  about	  the	  future	  action	  of	  the	  population	  as	  a	  
whole.”	  In	  other	  words,	  if	  the	  agent	  chose	  to	  use	  rule	  number	  6,	  she	  was	  predicting	  that	  the	  
whole	  of	  the	  population	  would	  choose	  a	  number	  that	  falls	  within	  the	  numerical	  confines	  of	  75	  
and	  85.	  Each	  of	  the	  rules	  was	  given	  a	  score	  between	  1	  and	  100	  depending	  on	  the	  responses	  of	  
the	  population.	  Each	  of	  the	  predictions,	  considering	  how	  closely	  they	  appeared	  to	  the	  average,	  
resulted	  in	  the	  addition	  or	  subtraction	  of	  a	  point	  to	  the	  score	  associated	  with	  the	  rule	  that	  was	  
used.	  	  
Next	  respondents	  were	  allowed	  to	  re-­‐evaluate	  their	  rules	  and	  alter	  their	  rule	  
endowment	  by	  removing	  a	  poorly	  performing	  rule	  and	  having	  a	  randomly	  selected	  rule	  take	  its	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place.	  According	  to	  the	  researchers,	  “this	  can	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  akin	  to	  a	  change	  in	  domestic	  
politics	  or	  an	  internal	  policy	  entrepreneur”	  (Hoffman,	  2000).	  In	  order	  to	  evaluate	  the	  affect	  of	  a	  
norm	  entrepreneur,	  half	  of	  the	  simulations	  were	  run	  with	  the	  involvement	  of	  a	  norm	  
entrepreneur	  and	  half	  without.	  Respondents	  were	  periodically	  offered	  a	  replacement	  to	  their	  
most	  poorly	  performing	  rule	  by	  the	  norm	  entrepreneur.	  Again	  the	  newly	  acquired	  rule	  started	  
out	  with	  a	  score	  of	  100.	  	  Multiple	  simulations	  were	  run	  so	  as	  to	  account	  for	  different	  noise	  
variables.	  	  
Results	  and	  Implications	  
	   A	  lack	  of	  a	  norm	  entrepreneur	  in	  the	  simulation	  led	  to	  either	  chaos	  or	  stability.	  Low	  
‘noise’	  levels	  eventually	  led	  to	  a	  consensus	  of	  the	  most	  dominant	  rule	  4.	  In	  contrast,	  when	  a	  
norm	  entrepreneur	  was	  present,	  the	  rule	  that	  became	  most	  dominant	  was	  number	  5,	  thereby	  
altering	  the	  natural	  inclinations	  of	  the	  control	  group.	  Accordingly,	  Hoffman’s	  results	  
demonstrate	  that	  norm	  entrepreneurs	  can	  play	  a	  role	  in	  norm	  emergence.	  Unsurprisingly,	  it	  is	  
difficult	  to	  prove	  in	  an	  experimental	  setting	  the	  causes	  of	  societal	  change.	  This	  being	  the	  case,	  
Hoffman’s	  study	  helps	  to	  validate	  the	  ability	  of	  an	  individual	  to	  alter	  a	  group’s	  choices	  and	  
behaviors.	  These	  results	  are	  relevant	  in	  that,	  even	  on	  the	  most	  basic	  of	  levels,	  it	  is	  an	  attempt	  
to	  support	  the	  norm	  entrepreneur’s	  ability	  to	  alter	  group	  conduct.	  	  
Triggers	  of	  In-­‐Group/Out-­‐Group	  Polarization	  
	   In	  2011,	  I	  along	  with	  other	  political	  science	  graduate	  students	  conducted	  a	  study	  into	  
how	  groups	  polarize.	  Our	  intentions	  were	  to	  observe	  whether	  or	  not	  exposure	  to	  certain	  
treatments	  negatively	  affects	  individual’s	  attitudes	  towards	  particular	  out-­‐groups.	  Following	  is	  a	  





Introduction	  and	  Methods	  
As	  researchers	  we	  developed	  a	  study	  meant	  to	  distinguish	  precursors	  to	  polarized	  
attitudes.	  Students	  were	  offered	  extra	  credit	  in	  return	  for	  their	  participation.	  On	  a	  pre-­‐selected	  
day,	  347	  students	  were	  randomly	  separated	  into	  three	  groups.	  Those	  groups	  were	  then	  taken	  
to	  separate	  locations	  and	  each	  was	  exposed	  to	  a	  different	  treatment.	  One	  group	  was	  shown	  a	  
hate	  speech	  given	  by	  British	  media	  personality	  Pat	  Condell,	  the	  second	  group	  was	  exposed	  to	  a	  
clip	  on	  the	  events	  of	  9/11,	  and	  the	  last	  was	  shown	  nothing.	  The	  clips	  themselves	  were	  accessed	  
via	  YouTube	  at	  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vjS0Novt3X4	  for	  the	  Pat	  Condell	  speech	  and	  
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y1Dg2eEhB30	  for	  the	  video	  montage	  on	  9/11.	  Following	  
their	  exposure	  to	  the	  treatments	  each	  participant	  was	  given	  a	  questionnaire	  to	  be	  used	  for	  
comparison	  with	  the	  control	  group.	  The	  questionnaire	  measured	  an	  individual’s	  feelings	  
towards	  what	  were	  considered	  three	  out-­‐groups,	  Al	  Qaeda,	  Muslims,	  and	  undocumented	  
immigrants.	  	  Next,	  respondents’	  questionnaires	  were	  compared	  with	  the	  control	  and	  results	  
were	  drawn.	  In	  an	  attempt	  to	  better	  validate	  results	  the	  experiment	  was	  re-­‐run	  at	  a	  later	  date	  
with	  a	  total	  of	  144	  subjects,	  the	  results	  of	  which	  are	  not	  included	  in	  this	  paper.	  	  
The	  treatments	  were	  meant	  to	  study	  first	  the	  affects	  of	  hate	  speech	  on	  attitudes	  
towards	  out	  groups,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  affects	  a	  traumatic	  event	  has	  on	  those	  same	  attitudes.	  The	  
non-­‐treatment	  participants	  were	  meant	  to	  play	  the	  part	  of	  the	  control	  group.	  The	  first	  
treatment	  was	  a	  clip	  of	  a	  hate	  speech	  given	  by	  Pat	  Condell,	  British	  media	  elite,	  concerning	  the	  
building	  of	  a	  mosque	  adjacent	  to	  ground	  zero.	  His	  intentions	  were	  to	  develop	  negative	  attitudes	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towards	  the	  building	  of	  the	  mosque	  as	  well	  as	  the	  nation	  of	  Islam.	  He	  drew	  a	  clear	  connection	  
between	  the	  perpetrators,	  Al	  Qaeda,	  and	  everyday	  Muslims.	  The	  second	  treatment	  was	  a	  video	  
montage	  of	  the	  events	  of	  9/11.	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  paper	  results	  from	  this	  treatment	  will	  
not	  be	  discussed	  as	  they	  are	  not	  relevant.	  	  
The	  questionnaire	  itself	  was	  a	  series	  of	  statements	  meant	  to	  measure	  whether	  or	  not	  
respondents’	  experienced	  polarized	  attitudes	  towards	  the	  out-­‐group	  in	  response	  to	  the	  
treatments.	  Attitudes	  that	  are	  implicated	  in	  the	  process	  of	  polarization	  include	  dehumanization,	  
fear,	  and	  moral	  depravity.	  Responses	  were	  measured	  on	  a	  seven	  point	  Likert	  scale	  with	  0	  equal	  
to	  a	  strong	  agreement	  with	  the	  statement	  and	  6	  equal	  to	  strong	  disagreement	  with	  the	  
statement.	  	  A	  high	  score	  indicated	  a	  more	  polarized	  attitude	  towards	  the	  out-­‐group.	  For	  those	  
questions	  that	  did	  not	  exactly	  correlate,	  answers	  were	  re-­‐coded	  to	  follow	  this	  directionality.	  
The	  questions	  were	  placed	  in	  a	  random	  order	  to	  avoid	  question	  bias.	  For	  a	  detailed	  listing	  of	  the	  
questionnaire	  refer	  to	  Appendix	  A.	  	  
Dehumanization	  as	  a	  Measure	  	   	   	  
There	  is	  a	  plethora	  of	  scholarship	  surrounding	  the	  definition	  of	  dehumanization.	  
According	  to	  Nussbaum	  (1999)	  objectification	  is	  a	  key	  component	  of	  dehumanization,	  and	  there	  
are	  seven	  elements	  that	  constitute	  Nussbaum’s	  theory;	  “instrumentality,	  ownership,	  denial	  of	  
autonomy,	  inertness,	  fungibility,	  violability,	  and	  denial	  of	  subjectivity.”	  Instrumentality,	  
ownership,	  and	  fungibility	  reflect	  the	  belief	  that	  one	  person	  is	  easily	  interchangeable	  with	  
another,	  i.e.	  each	  lacks	  an	  individual	  distinctness	  that	  would	  make	  them	  unique	  from	  others	  of	  
their	  kind.	  Denial	  of	  autonomy	  and	  inertness	  assume	  that	  the	  individual	  lacks	  agency	  (Haslam,	  
2006;	  Nussbaum,	  1999).	  Violability	  has	  to	  do	  with	  a	  belief	  that	  the	  individual	  fails	  to	  possess	  a	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sense	  of	  moral	  integrity.	  This	  is	  particularly	  important	  if	  the	  in-­‐group	  is	  to	  perceive	  the	  out-­‐
group	  as	  evil	  and	  deserving	  of	  poor	  treatment.	  Finally,	  a	  denial	  of	  subjectivity	  assumes	  that	  the	  
feelings	  of	  the	  out-­‐group	  can	  be	  completely	  disregarded	  (Haslam,	  2006;	  Nussbaum,	  1999).	  This	  
attitude	  is	  a	  necessary	  precursor	  to	  genocide	  as	  it	  allows	  the	  in-­‐group	  to	  avoid	  feelings	  of	  guilt	  
over	  their	  murderous	  behavior.	  	  	  	  
Equally	  important	  is	  a	  form	  of	  dehumanization	  that	  involves	  the	  animalization	  of	  the	  
individual	  (O’Brien,	  2003).	  According	  to	  Bar-­‐Tal	  (2000),	  dehumanizing	  beliefs	  are	  where,	  	  
“extremely	  negative	  characteristics	  are	  attributed	  to	  another	  group,	  with	  the	  
purpose	  of	  excluding	  it	  from	  acceptable	  human	  groups	  and	  denying	  it	  
humanity…[it	  involves]	  labeling	  a	  group	  as	  inhuman,	  either	  by	  reference	  to	  
subhuman	  categories…or	  by	  referring	  to	  negatively	  valued	  superhuman	  
creatures	  such	  as	  demons,	  monsters,	  and	  satans”	  (Haslam,	  2006;	  Bar-­‐Tal,	  2000).	  	  
	  
As	  a	  part	  of	  dehumanization,	  an	  individual’s	  identity	  is	  denied	  and	  he/she	  is	  no	  longer	  
considered	  a	  part	  of	  the	  community,	  almost	  to	  the	  point	  of	  non-­‐existence	  (Kelman,	  1976;	  
Opotow1990).	  As	  a	  means	  to	  measure	  the	  dehumanization	  of	  the	  out-­‐groups	  considered	  in	  this	  
study,	  certain	  questions	  involved	  terminology	  similar	  to	  that	  which	  is	  included	  in	  these	  
definitions.	  	  
Moral	  Depravity	  as	  a	  Measure	  
	   As	  an	  aspect	  of	  dehumanization,	  it	  is	  important	  also	  to	  gauge	  how	  the	  participants	  feel	  
about	  the	  out-­‐groups’	  morality,	  or	  lack	  thereof.	  According	  to	  Nussbaum’s	  concept	  of	  violability,	  
the	  dehumanized	  individual	  is	  perceived	  as	  having	  no	  moral	  integrity.	  Whether	  or	  not	  the	  out-­‐
groups	  were	  believed	  to	  ascribe	  to	  certain	  ideas	  of	  justice	  and/or	  fairness	  was	  important	  to	  
those	  aspects	  of	  dehumanization	  we	  wished	  to	  measure.	  The	  statement	  included	  in	  the	  survey	  
that	  directly	  related	  to	  this	  concept	  was,	  “Muslims	  lie,	  steal,	  cheat,	  and	  kill	  to	  achieve	  their	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goals.”	  As	  an	  aspect	  of	  what	  Bar-­‐Tal	  refers	  to	  as	  dehumanizing	  beliefs,	  it	  is	  imperative	  to	  study	  
whether	  or	  not	  the	  in-­‐group	  views	  the	  out-­‐group	  as	  not	  participating	  in	  acceptable	  human	  
behaviors.	  Those	  statements	  that	  addressed	  these	  attitudes	  were,	  “[the	  out-­‐group]	  is…	  very	  
corrupt,	  somewhat	  corrupt,	  etc.”	  Each	  statement	  was	  intended	  to	  measure	  attitudes	  of	  moral	  
depravity	  directed	  towards	  the	  out-­‐groups.	  	  
Fear	  as	  a	  Measure	  
According	  to	  Mark	  Warr	  (2000)	  fear	  is,	  “an	  emotion,	  a	  feeling	  of	  alarm	  or	  dread	  caused	  
by	  an	  awareness	  or	  expectation	  of	  danger”	  (Warr,	  2000;	  Kohm,	  2009).	  This	  would	  account	  for	  
the	  study’s	  attempt	  at	  measuring	  worry	  as	  an	  aspect	  of	  fear.	  Conversely,	  Garofolo	  (1981)	  
believes	  that	  the	  two	  are	  distinct	  in	  that	  fear	  is,	  “an	  emotional	  response	  to	  an	  imminent	  
threat,”	  whereas	  worry	  is	  more	  of	  a	  psychological	  response	  to	  some	  perceived	  future	  threat.	  
More	  recently,	  Vincent	  Sacco	  in	  When	  Crime	  Waves	  (2005)	  established	  a	  three	  part	  definition	  of	  
fear	  that	  involves	  a	  cognitive,	  emotional,	  and	  behavioral	  dimension	  (Kohm,	  2009;	  Sacco,	  2005).	  
The	  cognitive	  dimension,	  “focus[es]	  on	  individuals’	  subjective	  estimates	  of	  their	  likelihood	  of	  
victimization”	  (Sacco,	  2005;	  Kohm,	  2009).	  The	  emotional	  dimension	  relates	  to	  how	  people	  feel;	  
whereas	  the	  behavioral	  dimension	  relates	  to	  what	  people	  do	  in	  response	  to	  fear	  (Sacco,	  2005;	  
Kohm,	  2009).	  This	  is	  pertinent	  to	  the	  questionnaire	  that	  was	  administered	  as	  it	  supports	  the	  
validity	  of	  those	  questions	  chosen	  to	  measure	  fear.	  Questions	  relating	  to	  fear	  included	  the	  
statements	  “I	  feel	  safe	  around,”	  and	  “I	  worry	  that.”	  	  
Hate	  Speech	  the	  Tool	  of	  the	  Norm	  Entrepreneur	  
Hate	  speech	  is	  an	  emotional	  contagion	  and	  a	  key	  characteristic	  of	  any	  hate	  campaign;	  
features	  of	  which	  often	  include	  the	  dehumanization	  and	  demonization	  of	  the	  out-­‐group	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coupled	  with	  the	  ethnocentrism	  and	  siege	  mentality	  of	  the	  in-­‐group.	  By	  definition,	  hate	  speech	  
is	  typified	  by,	  “irrational,	  unsubstantiated,	  and	  unjustified	  antagonism	  toward	  a	  group	  or	  a	  
representative	  of	  a	  group,	  frequently	  entailing	  consistently	  disapproving,	  hypercritical,	  and	  
reiterated	  generalizations”	  (Vollhardt,	  2007).	  Such	  speech	  usually,	  “denigrates	  persons	  on	  the	  
basis	  of	  their	  race	  or	  ethnic	  origin,	  religion,	  gender,	  age,	  physical	  condition,	  disability,	  sexual	  
orientation,	  and	  so	  forth”	  (Leets,	  2002).	  Most	  importantly,	  hate	  speech	  is	  a	  punishable	  offense	  
particularly	  when	  in	  conjunction	  with	  genocide.	  According	  to	  a	  U.N	  tribunal,	  hate	  speech	  can	  be	  
a	  direct	  incitement	  to	  genocide	  depending	  on	  the	  tone	  and	  context	  of	  its	  transmission	  
(International,	  2003).	  	  Surprisingly,	  in	  order	  to	  be	  convicted	  of	  incitement	  to	  genocide,	  “proof	  of	  
actual	  causation,”	  is	  not	  necessary	  (International,	  2003.)	  
Despite	  the	  fact	  that	  hate	  speech	  is	  utilized	  in	  a	  myriad	  of	  differing	  geographical	  
locations	  and	  cultures,	  there	  is	  underlying	  unity	  with	  which	  such	  speech	  can	  be	  deconstructed.	  	  
First	  and	  foremost,	  the	  speaker	  must	  expound	  upon	  already	  existing,	  “stereotypes,	  societal	  
beliefs,	  cultural	  meanings,	  and	  other	  preconceptions	  about	  the	  targeted	  groups,”	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  
create	  and/or	  recreate	  societal	  norms	  (Vollhardt,	  2007).	  	  Detection	  of	  hate	  speech	  as	  put	  forth	  
by	  the	  authors	  of	  “Deconstructing	  Hate	  Speech	  in	  the	  DRC:	  A	  Psychological	  Media	  Sensitization	  
Campaign,”	  include	  that,	  “the	  communication	  contains	  instigating	  elements	  of	  the	  continuum	  
of	  violence;	  the	  communication	  is	  derogatory	  and	  violates	  standards	  of	  (argumentative)	  
integrity;	  and	  the	  suggested	  strategies	  do	  not	  offer	  real	  or	  constructive	  solutions	  to	  the	  existing	  
problems,	  and	  serve	  self-­‐interests	  of	  the	  speaker	  and/or	  his	  or	  her	  group	  only	  while	  harming	  
another”	  (Vollhardt,	  2007).	  	  Below	  is	  a	  graphical	  representation	  of	  the	  differences	  between	  





Hate	  Speech	   Neutral	  Speech	  
Arguments	  can	  be	  shared/supported	  
by	  	  	  	  only	  one	  group	  
	  
Biased	  view,	  one-­‐sided	  and	  distorted	  
perspectives	  
	  
Destructive	  spirit	  and	  solutions	  
	  
Focus	  on	  blame,	  personal	  attacks	  (on	  
the	  integrity	  of	  one	  person	  or	  group)	  
	  
Solutions	  benefit	  only	  one	  person	  or	  
group	  
	  






Emotionally	  charged	  (especially	  anger,	  
fear)	  
Arguments	  can	  be	  shared/supported	  
by	  many	  groups	  
	  
Balanced	  view,	  multiple	  perspectives	  
	  
	  
Constructive	  spirit	  and	  solutions	  
	  
Focus	  on	  issues	  and	  facts	  
	  
	  
Solutions	  benefit	  all	  of	  society	  
	  
	  




Neutral,	  respectful	  language	  
	  
Neutral	  and	  objective	  communication	  
	  
Using	  this	  deconstruction	  framework,	  fellow	  researchers	  analyzed	  the	  Pat	  Condell	  speech	  as	  a	  
means	  to	  identify	  dehumanizing,	  fear	  inducing,	  and	  demoralizing	  statements	  towards	  the	  out-­‐
group.	  The	  results	  of	  the	  analysis	  are	  documented	  in	  Appendix	  B.	  
Hypotheses	  
The	  hypotheses	  for	  this	  study	  that	  are	  most	  relevant	  to	  the	  investigation	  of	  the	  ability	  of	  
a	  norm	  entrepreneur	  to	  polarize	  attitudes	  are	  as	  follows:	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Hypothesis	  1:	  Individuals	  exposed	  to	  hate	  speech	  during	  which	  the	  out-­‐group	  is	  portrayed	  as	  
the	  enemy	  will	  demonstrate	  more	  negative	  dehumanizing	  attitudes	  towards	  the	  out-­‐groups	  
than	  those	  not	  exposed	  to	  a	  similar	  treatment.	  
Hypothesis	  2:	  Individuals	  exposed	  to	  hate	  speech	  during	  which	  the	  out-­‐group	  is	  portrayed	  as	  
the	  enemy	  will	  demonstrate	  attitudes	  towards	  the	  out-­‐groups	  that	  are	  more	  morally	  depraved	  
than	  those	  not	  exposed	  to	  a	  similar	  treatment.	  
Hypothesis	  3:	  Individuals	  exposed	  to	  hate	  speech	  during	  which	  the	  out-­‐group	  is	  portrayed	  as	  
the	  enemy	  will	  demonstrate	  more	  negative	  fear	  based	  attitudes	  towards	  the	  out-­‐groups	  than	  
those	  not	  exposed	  to	  a	  similar	  treatment.	  
Results	  and	  Implications	  
Table	  1.	  Means	  by	  Treatment	  Group	  and	  Polarization	  Attitudes	  
Fear	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Dehumanization	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Moral	  Depravity	  
	  
Treatment	  Group	  and	  Variable	   Meana	   SD	   Meana	   SD	   Mean	  a	  	   SD	  
Control	  Group	  (N=68)	   	   	   	   	   	   	  






Muslims	   2.0980	   1.3133
6	  
.9449	   .73409	   1.5356	   .92845	  
Undocumented	  Immigrants	  	   2.0343	   1.4283
8	  
1.3078	   .97991	   2.1471	   .94950	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Condell	  Speech	  Group	  (N=115)	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
















2.1965	   .97660	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aThe	  score	  ranges	  from	  0-­‐6;	  higher	  mean	  scores	  indicate	  a	  more	  negative	  attitude	  (Dawson,	  
2011)	  
	  
Above	  is	  a	  table	  representing	  the	  attitudinal	  means	  across	  all	  out-­‐groups	  in	  association	  
with	  both	  the	  control	  and	  the	  treatment	  group	  exposed	  to	  the	  Pat	  Condell	  clip.	  A	  higher	  mean	  
indicates	  a	  more	  negative	  attitude	  towards	  the	  represented	  out-­‐group.	  Understandably,	  
attitudes	  associated	  with	  the	  out-­‐group	  Al	  Qaeda	  were	  the	  most	  negative	  across	  both	  
treatments.	  Directly	  following	  were	  those	  results	  concerning	  Muslims	  as	  they	  were	  considered	  
the	  second	  most	  feared,	  dehumanized,	  and	  morally	  depraved.	  Lastly,	  undocumented	  
immigrants	  experienced	  the	  least	  negative	  attitudes	  regardless	  of	  exposure	  to	  the	  treatments.	  	  
Although	  it	  is	  interesting	  to	  view	  the	  average	  response	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  control,	  the	  following	  
tables	  indicate	  whether	  or	  not	  such	  changes	  were	  in	  fact	  statistically	  significant	  across	  the	  three	  
attitudes	  and	  in	  association	  with	  each	  of	  the	  out-­‐groups.	  
Table	  2.	  Changes	  in	  attitudes	  towards	  out-­‐groups	  resulting	  from	  exposure	  to	  Condell	  Clip	  
Exposure	  and	  Target	  Group	   Mean	  
Changea	  
T-­‐Score	   N	  
Condell	  Speech	  all	  groups	   	  -­‐0.42**	   -­‐3.19	   183	  
Condell	  Speech	  Al	  Qaeda	   	  	  	  	  -­‐0.30*	   -­‐1.78	   183	  
Condell	  Speech	  Muslims	   	  -­‐0.67**	   -­‐4.50	   183	  
Condell	  Speech	  Und	  Immigrants	   	  	  0.30**	   -­‐2.07	   183	  
*significant	  at	  the	  .10	  level	  
**significant	  at	  the	  .05	  level	  
	  
aA	  negative	  number	  indicates	  that	  exposures	  have	  generated	  more	  negative	  or	  derogatory	  
attitudes	  towards	  the	  group	  or	  groups	  involved	  
	  
	   This	  table	  is	  a	  total	  of	  all	  attitudes	  in	  response	  to	  the	  Condell	  speech	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  
control	  group.	  In	  comparison	  to	  the	  responses	  given	  by	  the	  control	  group,	  the	  Condell	  speech	  
significantly	  altered	  attitudes	  in	  a	  negative	  direction	  towards	  both	  Muslims	  and	  undocumented	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immigrants	  (significant	  at	  the	  .05	  level).	  In	  total,	  attitudes	  towards	  all	  groups	  were	  negatively	  
affected	  and	  were	  statistically	  significant	  again	  at	  the	  .05	  level.	  This	  indicates	  that	  hate	  speech	  
can	  change	  attitudes	  even	  in	  relation	  to	  out-­‐groups	  that	  are	  not	  directly	  the	  target	  of	  the	  
speech.	  There	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  negative	  emotional	  contagion	  inherent	  in	  what	  one	  would	  
consider	  hate	  speech.	  	  	  
Table	  3.	  Changes	  in	  dehumanizing	  attitudes	  directed	  towards	  out-­‐groups	  resulting	  from	  
exposure	  to	  Condell	  Clip	  
	  
Exposure	  and	  Target	  Group	   Mean	  
Changea	  
T-­‐Score	   N	  
Condell	  Speech	  all	  groups	   	  -­‐0.55**	   -­‐3.46	   183	  
Condell	  Speech	  Al	  Qaeda	   	  -­‐0.54**	   -­‐2.47	   183	  
Condell	  Speech	  Muslims	   	  -­‐0.61**	   -­‐4.12	   183	  
Condell	  Speech	  Undoc	  Immigrants	   	  -­‐0.47**	   -­‐2.83	   183	  
*significant	  at	  the	  .10	  level	  
**significant	  at	  the	  .05	  level	  
	  
aA	  negative	  number	  indicates	  that	  exposures	  have	  generated	  more	  negative	  or	  derogatory	  
attitudes	  towards	  the	  group	  or	  groups	  involved	  
	  
	   The	  above	  table	  reflects	  changes	  in	  dehumanizing	  attitudes	  directed	  towards	  the	  out-­‐
groups	  following	  exposure	  to	  the	  Condell	  clip.	  It	  appears	  that	  all	  attitudinal	  responses	  were	  
statistically	  significant	  at	  the	  .05	  level	  in	  relation	  to	  all	  of	  the	  out-­‐groups.	  This	  table	  supports	  
Hypothesis	  1	  in	  that	  dehumanizing	  attitudes	  became	  more	  negative	  following	  exposure	  to	  the	  
Pat	  Condell	  clip	  or	  hate	  speech.	  This	  implies	  that	  dehumanization,	  an	  important	  contributing	  
factor	  to	  genocide,	  can	  be	  caused	  by	  the	  mere	  exposure	  to	  hate	  speech.	  Equally	  disturbing	  are	  
the	  results	  that	  indicate	  that	  these	  attitudes	  are	  then	  associated	  with	  out-­‐groups	  that	  are	  not	  







Table	  4.	  Changes	  in	  moral	  depravity	  attitudes	  directed	  towards	  out-­‐groups	  resulting	  from	  
exposure	  to	  Condell	  Clip	  
	  
Exposure	  and	  Target	  Group	   Mean	  
Changea	  
T-­‐Score	   N	  
Condell	  Speech	  all	  groups	   	  	  	  -­‐0.28**	   -­‐2.19	   183	  
Condell	  Speech	  Al	  Qaeda	   	  	  	  	  	  -­‐0.11	   -­‐0.64	   183	  
Condell	  Speech	  Muslims	   	  	  	  -­‐0.67**	   -­‐4.31	   183	  
Condell	  Speech	  Undoc	  Immigrants	   	  	  	  	  	  -­‐0.05	   -­‐0.33	   183	  
*significant	  at	  the	  .10	  level	  
**significant	  at	  the	  .05	  level	  
	  
aA	  negative	  number	  indicates	  that	  exposures	  have	  generated	  more	  negative	  or	  derogatory	  
attitudes	  towards	  the	  group	  or	  groups	  involved	  
	  
	   These	  results	  are	  interesting	  in	  that	  Muslims	  were	  considered	  so	  morally	  depraved	  so	  as	  
to	  raise	  the	  statistical	  significance	  of	  all	  groups	  to	  a	  .05	  level.	  However,	  there	  was	  no	  statistical	  
significance	  involved	  in	  questions	  regarding	  Al	  Qaeda	  and	  undocumented	  immigrants.	  
Observers	  must	  consider	  that	  these	  responses	  are	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  control	  group.	  All	  this	  table	  
is	  indicating	  is	  a	  change	  in	  attitudes.	  It	  could	  be	  that	  having	  already	  felt	  that	  Al	  Qaeda	  was	  
morally	  depraved,	  the	  hate	  speech	  had	  little	  negative	  effect	  on	  pre-­‐existing	  attitudes.	  Also,	  the	  
fact	  that	  undocumented	  immigrants	  were	  not	  the	  target	  of	  this	  speech	  may	  have	  had	  an	  effect	  
on	  the	  association	  of	  such	  attitudes	  to	  the	  more	  distantly	  related	  out-­‐group.	  This	  table	  supports	  
Hypothesis	  2	  only	  in	  relation	  to	  attitudes	  associated	  with	  Muslims.	  This	  hate	  speech	  was	  more	  
significantly	  directed	  towards	  Muslims	  than	  Al	  Qaeda,	  although	  a	  comparison	  between	  the	  two	  







Table	  5.	  Changes	  in	  fear	  attitudes	  towards	  outgroups	  resulting	  from	  exposure	  to	  Condell	  Clip	  
	  
Exposure	  and	  Target	  Group	   Mean	  
Changea	  
T-­‐Score	   N	  
Condell	  Speech	  all	  groups	   	  	  	  -­‐0.45**	   -­‐2.85	   183	  
Condell	  Speech	  Al	  Qaeda	   -­‐0.24*	   -­‐1.27	   183	  
Condell	  Speech	  Muslims	   -­‐0.73*	   -­‐3.50	   183	  
Condell	  Speech	  Undoc	  Immigrants	   	  	  -­‐0.39**	   -­‐1.88	   183	  
*significant	  at	  the	  .10	  level	  
**significant	  at	  the	  .05	  level	  
	  
aA	  negative	  number	  indicates	  that	  exposures	  have	  generated	  more	  negative	  or	  derogatory	  
attitudes	  towards	  the	  group	  or	  groups	  involved	  
	  
	   Fear	  attitudes	  experienced	  a	  statistically	  significant	  negative	  change	  following	  exposure	  
to	  the	  Condell	  clip.	  These	  results	  support	  Hypothesis	  3.	  Particularly	  interesting	  is	  the	  high	  
significance	  of	  the	  attitudinal	  changes	  surrounding	  undocumented	  immigrants	  (.05	  level).	  	  
Apparently	  the	  fear	  invoked	  by	  the	  speech	  translated	  to	  other	  less	  relevant	  out-­‐groups.	  Results	  
indicate	  that	  fear	  attitudes	  directed	  towards	  both	  Al	  Qaeda	  and	  Muslims	  experienced	  a	  
statistically	  significant	  negative	  change	  as	  well	  at	  the	  .10	  level.	  In	  relation	  to	  genocide,	  fear	  as	  a	  
promoter	  of	  aggression	  can	  lower	  violent	  inhibitions,	  priming	  a	  group	  to	  perpetrate	  otherwise	  
unlikely	  acts.	  	  	  
Although	  these	  are	  simply	  preliminary	  results,	  this	  study	  demonstrates	  a	  disturbing	  
propensity	  for	  the	  development	  of	  polarized	  attitudes	  following	  exposure	  to	  hate	  speech.	  In	  
those	  aspects	  of	  polarization	  that	  were	  included	  in	  this	  study,	  attitudes	  became	  more	  negative	  
particularly	  in	  relation	  to	  Muslims.	  Interestingly,	  Muslims	  were	  not	  the	  perpetrators	  of	  9/11	  as	  
it	  was	  caused	  by	  an	  extremist	  from	  of	  Islamic	  terrorists,	  Al	  Qaeda.	  Yet,	  the	  association	  drawn	  by	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Pat	  Condell	  between	  the	  two	  clearly	  bolstered	  negative	  attitudes	  directed	  towards	  Muslims.	  
This	  being	  the	  case,	  the	  power	  of	  hate	  speech	  to	  polarize	  groups,	  particularly	  in	  a	  situation	  of	  
genocide	  must	  be	  discussed.	  Implications	  for	  such	  findings	  would	  be	  a	  development	  of	  
techniques	  to	  counteract	  the	  effects	  of	  such	  speech.	  Vollhardt	  et.	  al	  (2007)	  discusses	  the	  
necessity	  for	  distribution	  of	  education	  that	  runs	  contrary	  to	  the	  disinformation	  delivered	  in	  hate	  
speech.	  Simply	  the	  expressed	  indication	  of	  a	  distinction	  made	  between	  the	  perpetrators	  of	  Al	  
Qaeda	  and	  everyday	  Muslims	  could	  have	  counteracted	  the	  negative	  attitudes	  drawn	  from	  this	  
experiment.	  	  	  
Case	  Study:	  Rwanda	  
A	  History	  
The	  Ethnic	  Distinction:	  Us	  vs.	  Them	  
Historically,	  the	  delineation	  made	  between	  Tutsi	  and	  Hutu	  was	  first	  a	  political	  maneuver	  
fashioned	  by	  the	  colonizing	  powers.	  In	  1921,	  a	  mandate	  by	  the	  League	  of	  Nations	  left	  Rwanda	  
under	  Belgian	  rule	  (Hatzfeld,	  2005).	  According	  to	  the	  Belgians,	  the	  light	  skin	  and	  height	  of	  the	  
Tutsi	  likened	  them	  to	  a	  superior	  race	  such	  as	  themselves.	  This	  was	  supported	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  
the	  Tutsi	  also	  held	  positions	  of	  power	  within	  the	  countryside;	  the	  mwami	  himself,	  the	  King	  in	  
Rwandan	  tribal	  society,	  was	  a	  Tutsi.	  Additionally,	  the	  Tutsi	  were	  cattle	  herders	  while	  the	  Hutu	  
were	  predominantly	  agriculturalists,	  which	  created	  a	  class	  disparity	  (Taylor,	  1999).	  However,	  
despite	  obvious	  differences,	  such	  characteristics	  were	  not	  always	  easily	  discernable.	  In	  fact,	  
before	  colonization,	  the	  Hutu	  and	  Tutsi	  lived	  rather	  harmoniously	  and	  intermarriage	  was	  not	  
uncommon.	  A	  shared	  religion	  and	  culture	  further	  complicated	  ethnic	  distinctness	  and	  in	  the	  
years	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  genocide,	  it	  became	  difficult	  to	  distinguish	  one	  from	  another.	  Despite	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obstacles	  to	  categorizing	  the	  two	  groups,	  in	  1931	  the	  Belgians	  visually	  profiled	  the	  Rwandan	  
population,	  measuring	  their	  height	  and	  the	  length	  of	  their	  noses	  as	  a	  means	  to	  determine	  each	  
individual’s	  ethnicity.	  Thereafter,	  Rwandans	  were	  issued	  an	  identification	  card	  meant	  to	  label	  
them	  as	  being	  Tutsi,	  Hutu,	  or	  Twa	  (Mamdani,	  2001).	  	  
Following	  the	  issuance	  of	  ID	  cards,	  the	  Belgians	  began	  to	  indoctrinate	  the	  masses	  with	  
the	  idea	  of	  Tutsi	  superiority	  and	  privilege.	  The	  accepted	  religious	  ideology	  of	  the	  time	  was	  that	  
of	  European	  biological	  supremacy	  or	  the	  ‘Great	  Chain	  of	  Being’	  (Taylor,	  1999).	  The	  theory	  
postulated	  that	  Europeans	  were,	  “closer	  to	  God	  and	  the	  angels	  whereas	  Africans	  occupied	  a	  
position	  closer	  to	  lower	  animals”	  (Taylor,	  1999).	  This	  being	  the	  case,	  Europeans	  were	  naturally	  
the	  dominant	  people.	  However,	  as	  a	  means	  to	  explain	  the	  existence	  of	  clearly	  more	  civilized	  
persons	  in	  Africa,	  the	  Hamitic	  hypothesis	  was	  formed.	  Accordingly	  the	  ‘Hamites’	  were,	  
“responsible	  for	  bringing	  the	  rudiments	  of	  civilization	  to	  the	  region	  [of	  Africa]”	  (Taylor,	  1999).	  
According	  to	  the	  Belgians,	  the	  Tutsi	  were	  believed	  to	  be	  descendants	  of	  the	  biblical	  Ham,	  or	  
Noah’s	  southerly	  banished	  son	  (Taylor,	  1999).	  Therefore,	  Hamites	  were	  persons	  of	  white	  
foreign	  descent	  disguised	  under	  a	  black	  skin	  (Mamdani,	  2001).	  This	  explains	  why	  the	  lightness	  
of	  the	  Tutsis’	  skin	  played	  such	  a	  substantial	  role	  in	  the	  determination	  of	  their	  preeminence.	  The	  
strength	  with	  which	  the	  Hypothesis	  took	  hold	  was	  largely	  due	  to	  its	  religious	  nature.	  The	  Tutsi	  
and	  Hutu	  themselves	  ascribed	  to	  their	  own	  religious	  classism	  under	  which	  the	  mwami	  had	  to	  be	  
of	  Tutsi	  origin.	  The	  idea	  that	  the	  Tutsi	  were	  somehow	  religiously	  destined	  to	  be	  a	  ruling	  class	  
was	  somewhat	  understood	  and	  easily	  accepted.	  In	  response,	  the	  Hamitic	  Hypothesis	  was	  
taught	  in	  schools	  and	  Hutus	  were	  often	  denied	  certain	  educational	  and	  employment	  
opportunities,	  further	  limiting	  their	  likelihood	  for	  class	  mobility.	  Hutus	  were	  also	  kept	  from	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holding	  political	  positions	  of	  power	  and	  not	  long	  after,	  all	  the	  Hutu	  chieftains	  were	  replaced	  by	  
Tutsis	  (Mamdani,	  2001).	  The	  effect	  of	  such	  methods	  was	  the	  creation	  of	  ethnic	  tension	  
between	  the	  Tutsi	  and	  Hutu	  that	  had	  not	  previously	  existed.	  
In	  the	  year	  1959	  unrest	  as	  to	  the	  current	  situation	  of	  the	  state	  led	  to	  talk	  of	  a	  revolution.	  
The	  Tutsi	  elites	  were	  interested	  in	  removing	  the	  colonial	  power	  and	  the	  Hutu	  were	  interested	  in	  
regaining	  some	  semblance	  of	  equality.	  Following	  the	  death	  of	  the	  last	  mwami,	  the	  Hutu	  
peasantry	  massacred,	  forcing	  the	  mass	  exodus	  of	  hundreds	  of	  thousands	  of	  Tutsi	  (Hatzfeld,	  
2005).	  In	  response,	  in	  1961	  the	  Belgians	  endorsed	  a	  political	  maneuver	  meant	  to	  quell	  Hutu	  and	  
Tutsi	  revolutionary	  thought,	  open	  elections.	  It	  was	  quite	  obvious	  to	  all	  who	  the	  winner	  of	  such	  
an	  election	  would	  be;	  the	  Hutu	  majority	  guaranteed	  the	  election	  of	  the	  Hutu	  candidate	  
successfully	  ousting	  the	  Tutsi	  regime.	  This	  began	  a	  new	  period	  in	  which	  the	  Tutsi	  experienced	  
similar	  acts	  of	  repression	  as	  was	  previously	  perpetrated	  upon	  the	  Hutu.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  Tutsi	  
were	  given	  little	  political	  representation	  and	  educational	  opportunity.	  The	  situation	  was	  so	  bad	  
as	  to	  require	  the	  use	  of	  affirmative	  action	  policies	  which	  only	  worsened	  the	  inequity	  between	  
the	  two	  groups	  and	  strengthened	  their	  sense	  of	  otherness	  (Mamdani,	  2001).	  	  
In	  1961	  the	  switch	  in	  political	  power	  allowed	  the	  Hutu	  to	  seek	  social	  reparations	  for	  
historical	  wrongdoings;	  in	  1963	  the	  Rwandan	  army	  carried	  out	  the	  mass	  execution	  of	  
approximately	  10,000	  Tutsi	  (Hatzfeld,	  2005;	  Prunier,	  1995).	  This	  was	  in	  response	  to	  the	  return	  
of	  Tutsi	  exiles	  that	  had	  launched	  a	  military	  operation	  against	  the	  newly	  elected	  regime.	  This	  
same	  group	  of	  exiles	  was	  later	  referred	  to	  as	  Inyenzi	  or	  cockroaches	  by	  the	  Hutu.	  These	  attacks	  
only	  resulted	  in	  increased	  support	  for	  the	  Kayibanda	  regime,	  an	  outcome	  that	  the	  President	  
would	  try	  to	  reproduce	  in	  the	  early	  70’s	  with	  the	  massacre	  of	  even	  more	  Tutsi	  (Prunier,	  1995).	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Approximately	  700,000	  Tutsi	  fled	  Rwanda	  in	  response	  to	  political	  persecution	  by	  the	  Kayibanda	  
regime	  (Prunier,	  1995).	  	  
In	  1973,	  Major	  Juvenal	  Habyarimana	  overthrew	  the	  Kayibanda	  regime	  in	  a	  military	  coup	  
d’etat.	  This	  was	  followed	  by	  his	  election	  to	  the	  presidency	  in	  1978.	  At	  the	  beginning	  of	  his	  rule,	  
Rwanda	  and	  the	  Tutsi	  experienced	  a	  moment	  of	  reprieve	  at	  the	  ousting	  of	  the	  Kayibanda	  
regime.	  Yet,	  the	  political	  repression	  of	  the	  Tutsi	  continued,	  “there	  would	  not	  be	  a	  single	  Tutsi	  
bourgmestre	  or	  prefet,	  there	  was	  only	  one	  Tutsi	  officer	  in	  the	  whole	  army,	  there	  were	  two	  Tutsi	  
members	  of	  parliament	  out	  of	  seventy	  and	  there	  was	  only	  one	  Tutsi	  minister	  out	  of	  a	  cabinet	  of	  
between	  twenty-­‐five	  and	  thirty	  members”(Prunier,	  2005).	  Although	  violence	  against	  the	  Tutsi	  
subsided,	  Habyarimana	  mostly	  maintained	  the	  status	  quo	  originated	  by	  President	  Kayibanda.	  
Many	  of	  the	  quotas	  involving	  Tutsi	  employment	  and	  opportunities	  in	  education	  remained.	  In	  
the	  early	  90’s	  Habyarimana’s	  inaction	  would	  lead	  to	  a	  series	  of	  military	  attacks	  by	  the	  Rwandan	  
Patriotic	  Front	  (RPF),	  a	  group	  of	  politically	  radical	  Tutsi	  mercenaries.	  In	  response,	  the	  
Habyarimana	  regime	  organized	  the	  Interahamwe,	  an	  extremist	  Hutu	  militia.	  Ensuing	  violence	  
between	  the	  two	  groups	  led	  to	  the	  signing	  of	  the	  peace	  agreement,	  the	  Arusha	  Accords,	  in	  
1993	  between	  the	  governing	  regime	  and	  the	  RPF.	  However,	  subjugation	  of	  the	  Tutsi	  continued,	  
and	  ethnic	  tension	  and	  political	  unrest	  escalated.	  In	  April	  of	  1994,	  President	  Habyarimana’s	  
plane	  was	  shot	  down	  via	  a	  missile,	  reportedly	  by	  Hutu	  extremists,	  and	  the	  genocide	  officially	  
began.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Proposed	  Causes	  of	  the	  Rwandan	  Genocide	  
Over	  the	  years	  researchers	  have	  explored	  the	  causes	  of	  the	  Rwandan	  genocide.	  There	  
are	  three	  widely	  accepted	  explanations	  for	  what	  occurred;	  a	  focus	  on	  external	  influences,	  both	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colonial	  and	  neo-­‐colonial;	  a	  focus	  on	  domestic	  causes,	  including	  demographic	  factors	  and	  
ethnic	  conflict;	  and	  a	  psychosocial	  account	  based	  on	  the	  presumed	  social	  conformism	  and	  
obedience	  of	  Rwandans	  (Hintjens,	  2009).	  Author	  Jared	  Diamond	  hypothesizes	  that	  difficult	  
circumstances	  can	  lead	  to	  individual	  and	  group	  polarization,	  particularly	  instances	  of	  drought	  
and/or	  famine	  (Diamond,	  1999).	  According	  to	  his	  piece,	  “Malthus	  in	  Africa:	  Rwanda’s	  
Genocide,”	  food	  scarcity	  in	  Rwanda	  may	  have	  been	  a	  leading	  cause	  of	  the	  Genocide	  as	  Hutu	  
participants	  viewed	  the	  murder	  of	  the	  Tutsi	  as	  a	  means	  to	  bolster	  their	  prosperity	  (Diamond,	  
2005).	  Africa’s	  burgeoning	  population	  and	  its	  relation	  to	  the	  continent’s	  inability	  to	  produce	  
food	  cannot	  be	  ignored.	  Africa’s	  population	  growth	  is	  much	  like	  compound	  interest,	  where	  each	  
generation	  is	  building	  upon	  the	  previous	  one	  so	  the	  population	  is	  increasing	  exponentially	  with	  
every	  new	  birth.	  Soon	  it	  will	  become	  Malthusian	  in	  that	  it	  is	  unable	  to	  produce	  enough	  
sustenance	  in	  keeping	  with	  its	  dramatic	  growth	  in	  population	  (Diamond,	  2005).	  As	  one	  of	  the	  
highest	  ranked	  in	  population	  density	  for	  the	  continent,	  Rwanda	  is	  and	  was	  no	  exception.	  
Moreover,	  despite	  having	  utilized	  the	  more	  productive	  of	  food	  crops	  such	  as	  corn	  and	  beans,	  
the	  World	  Bank	  cited	  Rwanda	  as	  one	  of	  the	  poorest	  producers	  of	  food	  in	  the	  Sub-­‐Sahara	  
(Mamdani,	  2001).	  Regrettably,	  Rwandans	  failed	  to	  advance	  their	  productive	  capabilities;	  using	  
methods	  that	  were	  often	  counterproductive	  to	  the	  maintenance	  of	  their	  agricultural	  output.	  
Oftentimes	  plants	  were	  not	  rotated	  and	  the	  soil	  quality	  became	  so	  poor	  as	  to	  threaten	  the	  
success	  of	  entire	  crops.	  This	  left	  the	  populace	  hungry,	  and	  hunger	  could	  have	  proven	  a	  strong	  
impetus	  for	  violent	  behaviors.	  
According	  to	  a	  study	  conducted	  by	  Catherine	  Andre	  and	  Jean	  Platteau,	  there	  was	  a	  large	  
population	  of	  Rwandan	  youth	  left	  with	  little	  choice	  to	  move	  out	  and	  start	  anew.	  At	  the	  time,	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the	  average	  farm	  size	  in	  Rwanda	  was	  .89	  acres	  in	  1988	  and	  by	  1993	  it	  decreased	  to	  .72	  acres.	  
This	  was	  coupled	  with	  a	  population	  of	  over	  1740	  people	  per	  square	  mile.	  An	  unfortunate	  
consequence	  was	  a	  high	  number	  of	  men	  and	  women	  between	  the	  ages	  of	  20-­‐25	  still	  living	  at	  
home	  with	  their	  parents.	  Between	  the	  years	  of	  1988	  and	  1993	  the	  estimated	  percentage	  of	  
these	  men	  living	  at	  home	  rose	  from	  71%	  to	  100%	  this	  is	  in	  comparison	  to	  women	  who	  during	  
that	  same	  period	  rose	  from	  39%	  to	  67%.	  Further	  investigation	  by	  Andrea	  and	  Platteau	  
unearthed	  a	  propensity	  for	  conflict	  surrounding	  the	  acquisition	  of	  land.	  On	  average,	  households	  
reported	  at	  least	  one	  conflict	  a	  year	  that	  required	  the	  help	  of	  an	  outside	  arbiter.	  Interestingly,	  
43%	  of	  those	  total	  conflicts	  were	  disputes	  over	  land	  (Diamond,	  2005).	  This	  was	  no	  surprise	  as	  
the	  land	  had	  proven	  to	  have	  a	  decreasing	  return	  as	  each	  new	  generation	  of	  crops	  only	  
exacerbated	  the	  problem	  of	  soil	  quality.	  	  	  This	  being	  the	  case,	  the	  murder	  of	  a	  Tutsi	  often	  led	  to	  
the	  acquisition	  of	  his	  her	  property	  by	  the	  Hutu	  perpetrator.	  Oftentimes,	  particularly	  during	  the	  
genocide,	  Hutu	  killers	  were	  not	  only	  allowed	  the	  spoils	  of	  the	  kill	  but	  also	  were	  doubly	  
rewarded	  by	  the	  government.	  Therefore,	  land	  and	  property	  acquisition	  could	  have	  proven	  to	  be	  
a	  serious	  motivation	  to	  murder	  (Gourevitch,	  1998).	  However,	  critics	  would	  agree	  that	  there	  is	  
little	  proof	  that	  people	  were	  strictly	  killing	  out	  of	  greed.	  Although	  it	  is	  understandable	  that	  food	  
scarcity	  may	  breed	  aggressive	  behaviors,	  it	  still	  fails	  to	  address	  something	  as	  dramatic	  as	  
genocide.	   	  
Allison	  Desforges,	  one	  of	  the	  most	  popular	  authors	  of	  the	  Rwandan	  genocide	  
hypothesizes	  that	  politicians	  pursued	  ethnic	  violence	  in	  response	  to	  a	  perceived	  threat	  to	  their	  
power.	  Concerns	  over	  the	  lack	  of	  food	  and	  political	  unrest	  led	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  scapegoat,	  a	  
contributing	  factor	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  genocidal	  behaviors	  that	  was	  first	  introduced	  and	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perpetuated	  by	  the	  political	  powers	  of	  the	  time.	  Portraying	  the	  Tutsi	  as	  the	  scapegoat	  helped	  to	  
re-­‐direct	  political	  discontent	  and	  introduced	  genocide	  as	  the	  ultimate	  solution.	  Ironically,	  
genocide	  during	  the	  planting	  season	  only	  succeeded	  in	  decreasing	  the	  food	  production	  
capability	  of	  the	  country,	  further	  deepening	  the	  problem	  of	  scarcity	  (Hintjens,	  1999).	  Not	  to	  
mention,	  the	  Rwandan’s	  possessed	  an	  unquestioning	  obedience,	  as	  the	  mwamis	  of	  old	  had	  a	  
particular	  leadership	  style	  that	  assumed,	  “When	  the	  ruler	  gives	  an	  order,	  he	  must	  be	  obeyed,	  
not	  because	  his	  order	  falls	  into	  the	  sphere	  over	  which	  he	  has	  authority,	  but	  simply	  because	  he	  
is	  the	  ruler”	  (Prunier,	  1995).	  Deforges’	  theory	  is	  supportive	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  norm	  
entrepreneur,	  as	  she	  postulates	  that	  the	  political	  authority	  pursued	  the	  genocide	  in	  response	  to	  
political	  instability.	  	  	  
Another	  proposed	  cause	  of	  the	  Rwandan	  genocide	  was	  the	  culmination	  of	  ethnic	  
hatreds.	  Clearly,	  the	  separateness	  with	  which	  the	  groups	  operated	  coupled	  with	  the	  
domination	  of	  first	  the	  Hutu	  and	  then	  the	  Tutsi	  lead	  to	  polarized	  attitudes	  and	  the	  emergence	  
of	  violent	  behaviors.	  However,	  similar	  conflicts	  have	  not	  resulted	  in	  such	  an	  extreme	  as	  was	  the	  
Rwandan	  genocide.	  Arguments	  could	  be	  made	  that	  ethnically	  based	  class	  distinctions	  have	  
existed	  for	  centuries	  and	  genocide	  is	  largely	  a	  historical	  rarity.	  The	  actions	  of	  the	  Belgians	  only	  
succeeded	  in	  widening	  the	  difference	  in	  class	  between	  the	  Hutus	  and	  the	  Tutsis.	  Prior	  to	  
colonization	  such	  a	  distinction	  was	  not	  so	  clearly	  made.	  This	  set	  the	  state	  for	  the	  breeding	  of	  
class	  disparity.	  Although	  the	  ethnic	  division	  between	  Hutus	  and	  the	  Tutsis	  was	  not	  the	  sole	  
cause	  of	  the	  genocide,	  it	  was	  a	  significant	  contributing	  factor	  to	  its	  creation.	  	  The	  
aforementioned	  causes	  helped	  to	  form	  an	  atmosphere	  that	  was	  conducive	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	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genocide;	  however,	  it	  took	  the	  introduction	  of	  norm	  entrepreneurs	  in	  order	  to	  intensify	  ethnic	  
polarization	  to	  the	  point	  that	  genocide	  occurred. 
Genocide	  Begins	  with	  the	  Introduction	  of	  the	  Norm	  Entrepreneur	  
	   In	  1994	  there	  was	  a	  6	  week	  period	  during	  which	  over	  800,000	  or	  11%	  of	  the	  Rwandan	  
population	  was	  murdered	  (Mamdani,	  2001).	  The	  motivations	  behind	  such	  an	  atrocity	  may	  
never	  be	  fully	  understood.	  Clearly,	  as	  history	  indicates,	  the	  atmosphere	  was	  primed	  for	  the	  
emergence	  of	  genocidal	  behaviors.	  Ethnic	  tension	  and	  disparity	  had	  been	  mounting	  since	  
Belgian	  colonial	  rule	  in	  the	  early	  1920’s.	  I	  argue	  that	  each	  of	  these	  causes	  played	  a	  role,	  
however	  it	  was	  the	  norm	  entrepreneur	  that	  was	  the	  key	  to	  the	  exacerbation	  of	  said	  causes	  and	  
inevitably	  the	  catalyst	  needed	  for	  genocide	  to	  occur.	  Following,	  are	  the	  first	  seven	  of	  the	  eight	  
stages	  of	  genocide	  as	  put	  forth	  by	  Dr.	  Gregory	  Stanton	  of	  Genocide	  Watch	  and	  the	  role	  the	  
norm	  entrepreneur	  played	  in	  Rwanda	  in	  either	  creating	  or	  worsening	  ethnic	  polarization	  during	  
each	  of	  those	  stages.	  
Stage	  1:	  Classification	  and	  Stage	  2:	  Symbolization	  
According	  to	  Dr.	  Gregory	  Stanton,	  classification	  is	  the	  act	  of	  creating	  groups	  along	  
ethnic,	  religious,	  national,	  or	  racial	  lines.	  Symbolization	  is	  applying	  names	  or	  symbols	  to	  those	  
classifications.	  As	  such,	  both	  stages	  are	  integrally	  tied.	  For	  instance,	  in	  Rwanda	  the	  issuance	  of	  
ID	  cards	  coupled	  with	  such	  visible	  markers	  as	  skin	  color,	  would	  later	  be	  the	  primary	  way	  in	  
which	  persons	  were	  identified	  for	  murder	  during	  the	  genocide.	  Quick	  and	  easy,	  there	  was	  no	  
discussion	  over	  an	  individual’s	  ethnicity	  as	  the	  cards	  indicated	  his/her	  racial	  identity.	  The	  ID	  
cards	  not	  only	  signified	  ethnic	  distinctness	  but	  also	  symbolically	  created	  a	  marker	  with	  which	  
individuals	  could	  be	  recognized	  for	  dispatch.	  Additionally,	  such	  myths	  as	  the	  Hamitic	  Hypothesis	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that	  had	  worked	  in	  favor	  of	  Tutsi	  rule	  inevitably	  resulted	  in	  their	  death.	  The	  Hypothesis	  came	  to	  
symbolize	  that	  the	  Tutsi	  were	  not	  indigenous	  to	  the	  area,	  the	  “Hamitic	  discourse	  was	  reversed:	  
from	  the	  status	  of	  race	  superieur	  to	  that	  of	  minorite	  d’envahisseur,	  or	  foreigners	  in	  their	  own	  
country”	  (Branstatter,	  1997).	  According	  to	  Gerard	  Prunier	  in	  The	  Rwanda	  Crisis:	  History	  of	  a	  
Genocide,	  “The	  newly	  redefined	  Rwandese	  Tutsi	  aristocracy	  was	  particularly	  sensitive	  to	  the	  
‘scientific’	  guarantees	  which	  could	  be	  found	  for	  its’	  ‘nobility’.	  Even	  today,	  among	  exiled	  Tutsi,	  
the	  myth	  of	  Egyptian	  origins	  still	  survives	  in	  the	  heads	  of	  people	  who	  are	  now	  its	  victims	  after	  
having	  thought	  they	  were	  it	  beneficiaries”	  (Prunier,	  1995).	  Interestingly,	  Prunier	  (1995)	  
observes	  that	  there	  is	  little	  evidence	  of	  the	  existence	  of	  violence	  between	  the	  Tutsi	  and	  Hutu	  
prior	  to	  colonization	  by	  the	  Belgians.	  In	  both	  cases,	  the	  Belgians	  played	  the	  role	  of	  norm	  
entrepreneur.	  Their	  authority	  in	  these	  matters,	  gave	  such	  declarations	  a	  commanding	  quality.	  	  
The	  idea	  that	  the	  Tutsi	  were	  alien	  to	  Rwanda	  was	  utilized	  in	  a	  hate	  speech	  given	  by	  Leon	  
Mugesera,	  a	  Hutu	  political	  authority	  and	  vice	  president	  of	  the	  National	  Republican	  Movement	  
for	  Democracy	  and	  Development	  (MRND),	  during	  which	  he	  demanded	  that	  the	  Tutsi	  be,	  “sent	  
back	  home	  to	  Ethiopia	  where	  they	  supposedly	  came	  from.	  Their	  destination	  was	  to	  be	  reached	  
‘via	  [the]	  Nyaborongo	  [river]	  on	  an	  express	  trip”	  (Chretian,	  1995;	  Article	  19,	  1995).	  Ironically,	  
during	  the	  genocide,	  “tens	  of	  thousands	  of	  Rwandans’	  dead	  bodies	  did	  float	  down	  the	  
Nyaborongo	  river,	  almost	  all	  of	  them	  Tutsi	  or	  part	  Tutsi”	  (Chretian,	  1995).	  As	  a	  norm	  
entrepreneur,	  Mugesera	  indicated	  that	  the	  Tutsi	  were	  unwanted	  and	  were	  different	  from	  the	  
Hutu	  majority,	  “We	  the	  people	  are	  obliged	  to	  take	  responsibility	  ourselves	  and	  wipe	  out	  this	  
scum.	  Their	  home	  is	  Ethiopia”	  (Mugitoni,	  2010).	  Mugesera’s	  words	  took	  on	  a	  commanding	  
quality,	  especially	  if	  one	  were	  to	  consider	  the	  Rwandans	  propensity	  to	  obey.	  His	  words	  relieved	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the	  Hutus’	  of	  any	  and	  all	  reasons	  not	  to	  kill	  the	  Tutsi.	  This	  phenomenon	  is	  similar	  to	  that	  
experienced	  in	  both	  Milgram’s	  shock	  experiment	  and	  Zimbardo’s	  SPE.	  As	  a	  politically	  powerful	  
individual,	  Mugesera,	  took	  on	  the	  role	  of	  norm	  entrepreneur.	  He	  not	  only	  indicated	  there	  was	  a	  
difference	  between	  the	  Hutu	  and	  Tutsi,	  but	  also	  signified	  the	  necessity	  of	  their	  expulsion	  from	  
Rwanda.	  By	  demonstrating	  a	  tangible	  dissimilarity	  between	  the	  Hutu	  and	  Tutsi,	  i.e.	  the	  Tutsis’	  
foreign	  status,	  a	  wedge	  was	  driven	  between	  the	  two	  groups	  that	  allowed	  for	  the	  development	  
of	  polarized	  attitudes	  as	  was	  seen	  in	  Jane	  Elliott’s	  experiment	  as	  well	  as	  Zimbardo’s	  SPE.	  	  
The	  myth	  surrounding	  Tutsi	  superiority	  would	  be	  the	  basis	  upon	  which	  the	  Tutsi	  
conspiracy	  was	  created.	  According	  to	  President	  Habyarimana,	  the	  “little	  man”	  or	  Hutu	  were	  
constantly	  being	  oppressed	  and	  exploited	  by	  the	  “parasitic	  traders	  and	  misguided	  intellectuals”	  
or	  Tutsi	  (Newbury,	  1992;	  Van	  der	  Meeren,	  1996;	  Hintjens,	  1999).	  Habyarimana	  blamed	  the	  
economic	  crises	  on	  these	  “traders,	  merchants	  and	  intellectuals,”	  professions	  in	  which	  the	  Tutsi	  
tended	  to	  specialize	  (Hinjens,	  1999).	  Words	  such	  as	  these	  became	  symbolic	  of	  the	  Tutsi,	  all	  of	  
which	  were	  negatively	  connotative	  descriptors	  (Hintjens,	  1999).	  By	  creating	  such	  terminology,	  
Habyarimana	  was	  able	  to	  euphemize	  the	  idea	  of	  elimination.	  He	  successfully	  removed	  the	  
concept	  of	  the	  individual	  and	  created	  a	  group	  which	  he	  could	  then	  scapegoat.	  Habyarimana	  felt	  
close	  to	  the	  agriculturalist	  Hutu	  peasantry	  and	  often	  romanticized	  himself	  as	  one	  with	  the	  
people.	  In	  contrast,	  he	  believed	  the	  Tutsi	  were	  more	  closely	  related	  to	  the	  colonizing	  Belgians,	  
and	  as	  such	  he	  associated	  them	  with	  the	  feudal	  class.	  	  He	  saw	  them	  as	  “petty	  bourgeois”	  
(Verwimp,	  2000).	  In	  a	  speech	  made	  at	  the	  National	  University	  in	  Butare	  President	  Habyarimana	  
stated:	  
“The	  coup	  d’etat	  that	  we	  did,	  was	  above	  all	  a	  moral	  coup	  d’etat.	  And	  what	  we	  
want,	  and	  we	  would	  consider	  our	  action	  as	  failed	  if	  we	  do	  not	  reach	  this	  goal,	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what	  we	  want,	  is	  to	  ban	  once	  and	  for	  all,	  the	  spirit	  of	  intrigue	  and	  feudal	  
mentality.	  What	  we	  want	  is	  to	  give	  back	  labor	  and	  individual	  yield	  its	  real	  value.	  
Because,	  we	  say	  it	  again,	  the	  one	  who	  refuses	  to	  work	  is	  harmful	  to	  society”	  
(Habyarimana,	  1973).	  
	  
An	  analysis	  of	  this	  excerpt	  is	  provided	  by	  the	  author	  Verwimp	  (2000),	  	  
“(1)	  he	  says	  he	  did	  not	  engage	  in	  a	  coup	  d’etat,	  but	  a	  moral	  coup	  d’etat.	  
Something	  of	  a	  higher,	  divine	  order.	  He	  sees	  himself	  as	  a	  person	  of	  historic	  
importance.	  (2)	  His	  coup	  d’etat	  has	  a	  goal,	  an	  objective.	  Habyarimana	  literally	  
says	  that	  he	  would	  consider	  his	  coup	  d’etat	  to	  have	  failed	  if	  he	  did	  not	  reach	  that	  
goal.	  This	  speaker	  clearly	  has	  embarked	  on	  a	  mission.	  (3)	  In	  the	  next	  part	  one	  
learns	  what	  the	  objective	  is,	  namely	  to	  ban,	  once	  and	  for	  all,	  the	  spirit	  of	  intrigue	  
and	  feudal	  mentality.	  This	  is	  the	  most	  important	  part.	  These	  are	  exactly	  the	  
words	  the	  regime	  used	  when	  it	  was	  talking	  about	  the	  Tutsi.	  The	  Tutsi	  were	  
considered	  the	  feudalists,	  the	  former	  masters	  of	  the	  Hutu	  peasants.	  You	  cannot	  
trust	  them,	  the	  Hutu	  ideology	  accuses	  (intrigue);	  they	  are	  always	  plotting	  against	  
the	  Hutu	  and	  working	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  their	  own	  ethnic	  group”	  (Verwimp,	  
2000).	  
	  
However	  subtle,	  Habyarimana’s	  statements	  fulfill	  the	  definition	  of	  hate	  speech	  as	  discussed	  in	  
the	  article	  by	  Vollhardt	  et.	  al	  (2007).	  Following	  is	  a	  deconstruction	  of	  Habyarimana’s	  speech	  in	  
relation	  to	  the	  framework	  set	  forth	  by	  the	  authors:	  
1. Contains	  instigating	  elements	  of	  continuum	  of	  violence	  
a. Distinction	  between	  us	  and	  them.	  	  People	  referred	  to	  by	  group	  
membership,	  information	  about	  origin	  used	  to	  label	  them	  as	  foreigners.	  	  
Achieved	  by	  pointing	  out	  affiliation	  with	  region,	  nationality,	  religion,	  or	  
language	  group	  different	  than	  the	  majority	  of	  listeners	  
b. Individuals/group	  blamed	  for	  misfortune	  of	  country	  (historical/present	  
difficulties)	  
c. Accused	  of	  disloyalty,	  treachery,	  alliance	  with	  other	  countries	  
(particularly	  with	  the	  enemy)	  or	  the	  previous	  regime,	  implying	  threat	  and	  
appealing	  to	  emotions	  of	  listeners	  (Vollhardt	  et.	  al	  (2007).	  
	  
Habyarimana	  clearly	  creates	  an	  Us	  vs	  Them	  mentality	  with	  his	  comment,	  “…what	  we	  want,	  is	  to	  
ban	  once	  and	  for	  all,	  the	  spirit	  of	  intrigue	  and	  feudal	  mentality…Because	  we	  say	  it	  again,	  the	  
one	  who	  refuses	  to	  work	  is	  harmful	  to	  society.”	  This	  statement	  euphemistically	  references	  the	  
44	  
	  
Tutsi	  as	  the	  ‘feudal	  mentality’	  which	  he	  wishes	  to	  ban.	  Next	  he	  scapegoats	  the	  Tutsi	  as	  a	  
problem	  that	  is	  “harmful	  to	  society.”	  As	  established	  in	  earlier	  paragraphs,	  Habyarimana	  
believes	  only	  that	  the	  agriculturalists	  or	  Hutu	  are	  contributors	  to	  the	  economy.	  Since	  a	  
distinction	  has	  been	  made	  that	  the	  Tutsi	  are	  generally	  the	  “traders,	  merchants	  and	  
intellectuals”	  it	  is	  implied	  that	  they	  are	  the	  ones	  hurting	  society	  and	  subsequently	  Rwanda’s	  
potential	  to	  flourish.	  This	  idea	  is	  directly	  tied	  to	  Vollhardt	  et.	  al	  (2007)	  concept	  of	  scapegoating,	  
as	  the	  Tutsi	  are	  seen	  as	  a	  problem	  for	  which	  a	  solution	  must	  exist.	  Also,	  the	  connection	  made	  
between	  the	  Tutsi	  and	  the	  early	  colonizing	  powers’	  ‘feudal	  mentality’	  essentially	  accuses	  the	  
group	  of	  “disloyalty,	  treachery,	  [and]	  alliance	  with	  other	  countries”	  (Vollhardt	  et.	  al,	  (2007).	  	  
	   After	  further	  deconstructing	  Habyarimana’s	  speech	  it	  is	  clear	  his	  words	  fall	  under	  the	  
category	  of	  hate	  speech	  and	  are	  punishable	  as	  they	  are	  inciting	  genocidal	  action.	  	  Upon	  further	  
review,	  Habyarimana’s	  speech	  fulfills	  many	  of	  the	  authors’	  requirements.	  
1. Suggested	  strategies	  do	  not	  offer	  real/constructive	  solutions	  to	  existing	  problems,	  and	  
serve	  self-­‐interests	  of	  speaker	  and/or	  his	  group	  while	  only	  harming	  another	  group	  
a. Speaker	  attains	  direct	  political	  gain	  and	  increase	  in	  power	  by	  harming	  target	  
b. Focus	  on	  individuals/groups	  rather	  than	  issue	  
c. Focus	  on	  alleged	  source	  of	  problems	  and	  blaming	  targeted	  group/individual,	  
accuser	  offers	  simplistic	  solutions	  and	  doesn’t	  take	  into	  account	  
complexity/multi-­‐faceted	  nature	  of	  societal	  problems.	  Promised	  solution	  not	  a	  
real	  solution	  
d. Offered	  solutions	  destructive	  rather	  than	  constructive	  in	  nature,	  based	  on	  
exclusion	  of	  certain	  individuals/group	  from	  political	  power/society	  in	  general	  
e. Communicated	  ideas/suggested	  solutions	  for	  problems	  not	  inclusive	  of	  all	  
society,	  but	  instead	  benefit	  a	  specific	  group	  while	  excluding	  others	  
Habyarimana’s	  comments	  do	  not	  offer	  a	  constructive	  solution	  to	  the	  problems	  he	  describes.	  In	  
fact,	  his	  solution	  is	  to,	  “ban	  once	  and	  for	  all,	  the	  spirit	  of	  intrigue	  and	  feudal	  mentality.”	  This	  is	  a	  
direct	  attempt	  to	  focus	  the	  problems	  of	  the	  economy	  on	  the	  Tutsi	  as	  a	  group	  rather	  than	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address	  solvable	  issues.	  Another	  obvious	  result	  of	  the	  elimination	  of	  the	  Tutsi	  is	  a	  strengthening	  
of	  the	  Habyarimana	  regime,	  “speaker	  attains	  direct	  political	  gain	  and	  increase	  in	  power	  by	  
harming	  target”	  (Vollhardt	  et.	  al,	  2007).	  During	  this	  time	  there	  is	  a	  democratization	  movement	  
going	  on	  in	  Rwanda	  that	  demands	  the	  inclusion	  of	  minority	  political	  groups	  such	  as	  the	  
Rwandan	  Patriotic	  Front	  (RPF).	  By	  eliminating	  the	  Tutsi,	  he	  thereby	  eliminates	  his	  competition.	  
He	  also	  succeeds	  in	  creating	  a	  scapegoat,	  a	  tactic	  utilized	  by	  many	  administrations	  when	  
support	  seems	  to	  wane	  due	  to	  issues	  of	  economic	  crisis,	  resource	  scarcity,	  and/	  or	  institutional	  
weakness.	  The	  solution	  seems	  simple	  enough;	  eliminate	  the	  Tutsi	  ‘threat.’	  	  	  
	   As	  a	  primary	  norm	  entrepreneur,	  Habyarimana’s	  attempts	  to	  symbolize	  the	  Tutsi	  
conspiracy	  allowed	  the	  Hutu	  to	  distance	  themselves	  from	  the	  impending	  genocide.	  In	  keeping	  
with	  methods	  utilized	  during	  other	  genocides,	  creating	  euphemistic	  terms	  for	  concepts	  such	  as	  
murder	  and	  ethnic	  polarization	  allowed	  the	  Hutu	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  ‘final	  solution’	  rather	  than	  get	  
caught	  up	  in	  the	  conflicting	  morality	  of	  taking	  a	  life.	  Symbols	  also	  allowed	  quick	  recall	  of	  
emotions	  that	  had	  come	  to	  be	  attached	  to	  said	  words	  or	  images.	  By	  repeatedly	  referring	  to	  the	  
Tutsi	  as	  ‘feudal’	  or	  ‘traders,	  merchants,	  and	  intellectuals,’	  the	  Tutsi	  were	  immediately	  called	  to	  
mind	  without	  the	  norm	  entrepreneur	  having	  to	  fully	  divulge	  his/her	  actual	  intentions.	  On	  the	  
surface,	  the	  speech	  seems	  innocent	  enough;	  however,	  one	  must	  consider	  that	  Habyarimana	  
was	  under	  the	  microscope	  that	  was	  the	  Arusha	  Accords,	  an	  internationally	  publicized	  event	  
intended	  to	  bring	  peace	  among	  the	  Hutu	  and	  Tutsi.	  The	  study	  I	  helped	  to	  conduct	  on	  hate	  
speech	  supports	  the	  claim	  that	  such	  techniques	  may	  cause	  the	  development	  of	  dehumanizing	  
attitudes	  towards	  the	  out-­‐group	  while	  promoting	  an	  atmosphere	  of	  fearfulness,	  which	  in	  the	  
case	  of	  genocide	  may	  lead	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  violent	  behavior.	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The	  composition	  of	  the	  groups,	  as	  arbitrary	  as	  they	  were,	  created	  polarizing	  attitudes	  
similar	  to	  those	  that	  resulted	  from	  both	  Jane	  Elliott’s	  Blue-­‐Eyed	  Brown-­‐Eyed	  Experiment	  and	  
Zimbardo’s	  Stanford	  Prison	  Experiment.	  Such	  division	  created	  anonymity	  among	  individuals	  
within	  the	  group,	  and	  participants	  in	  the	  genocide	  were	  most	  likely	  affected	  by	  a	  perceived	  lack	  
of	  consequences	  similar	  to	  those	  experienced	  in	  Zimbardo’s	  study,	  Diary	  of	  an	  Abandoned	  
Automobile.	  The	  efforts	  put	  forth	  by	  the	  Belgians	  to	  establish	  Tutsi	  superiority	  gave	  the	  norm	  
entrepreneurs	  of	  the	  genocide	  ample	  ammunition	  with	  which	  to	  turn	  the	  Hutu	  against	  the	  
Tutsi.	  The	  stage	  was	  set	  for	  the	  exacerbation	  of	  already	  polarized	  attitudes	  leading	  up	  to	  and	  
during	  the	  Rwandan	  genocide.	  	  
Stage	  3:	  Dehumanization	  
	   An	  important	  aspect	  of	  any	  genocide	  is	  the	  dehumanization	  of	  the	  out-­‐group.	  The	  in-­‐
group,	  composed	  of	  mostly	  normal	  everyday	  people,	  needs	  some	  impetus	  to	  commit	  mass	  
murder.	  This	  is	  where	  a	  norm	  entrepreneur,	  as	  an	  authority	  figure,	  introduces	  examples	  of	  how	  
an	  individual	  may	  behave.	  For	  instance,	  Pauline	  Nyiramasuhuko,	  the	  national	  Minister	  of	  Family	  
and	  Women’s	  Affairs,	  ordered	  the	  rape	  and	  murder	  of	  Tutsi	  women	  and	  children	  after	  luring	  
them	  into	  a	  trap	  with	  the	  promise	  of	  safety.	  These	  rapes	  were	  perpetrated	  in	  front	  of	  an	  
audience	  as	  if	  to	  say	  this	  is	  the	  way	  Hutus	  are	  to	  behave	  and	  Tutsis	  are	  to	  be	  treated.	  
Nyiramasuhuko	  went	  as	  far	  as	  to	  order	  her	  son	  Shalom	  to	  join	  in.	  A	  child	  at	  the	  time,	  he	  later	  
recounted	  that	  his	  mother	  gave	  him	  “permission”	  to	  rape	  the	  Tutsi	  women	  (Zimbardo,	  2007).	  
This	  demonstrates	  the	  power	  of	  obedience	  to	  authority,	  a	  response	  similar	  to	  those	  recorded	  in	  
Milgram’s	  experiment.	  The	  political	  authority	  held	  by	  Nyiramasuhuko	  helped	  to	  intensify	  the	  
view	  that	  mistreatment	  of	  the	  Tutsi	  would	  have	  no	  consequences;	  in	  fact	  the	  government	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encouraged	  it.	  Her	  endorsement	  of	  such	  dehumanizing	  actions	  as	  sexual	  torture	  allowed	  the	  
Hutu	  to	  suspend	  their	  feelings	  of	  humanness	  towards	  the	  Tutsi	  and	  encouraged	  their	  violent	  
behavior.	  Such	  responses	  were	  also	  apparent	  in	  the	  SPE.	  The	  guards,	  like	  the	  participants	  in	  the	  
scenario	  above,	  were	  drawn	  into	  their	  roles,	  at	  times	  exceeding	  expectations.	  It	  is	  evident	  that	  
the	  dehumanization	  that	  took	  place	  helped	  to	  disengage	  the	  feelings	  of	  the	  in-­‐group	  towards	  
the	  out-­‐group,	  “I	  had	  taken	  the	  life	  of	  a	  neighbor.	  I	  mean,	  at	  the	  fatal	  instant	  I	  did	  not	  see	  in	  
him	  what	  he	  had	  been	  before;	  I	  struck	  someone	  who	  was	  no	  longer	  either	  close	  or	  strange	  to	  
me,	  who	  wasn’t	  exactly	  ordinary	  anymore,	  I’m	  saying	  like	  the	  people	  you	  meet	  every	  day.	  His	  
features	  were	  indeed	  similar	  to	  those	  of	  the	  person	  I	  knew,	  but	  nothing	  firmly	  reminded	  me	  
that	  I	  had	  lived	  beside	  him	  for	  a	  long	  time”	  (Hatzfeld,	  2005).	  	  As	  with	  any	  warlike	  situation,	  
murder	  was	  expected	  therefore	  those	  in	  the	  in-­‐group	  had	  to	  desensitize	  themselves	  so	  as	  to	  
overcome	  their	  natural	  moral	  conscience.	  	  	  
	   In	  1991,	  Habyarimana	  faked	  an	  attack	  on	  his	  men	  and	  blamed	  it	  on	  the	  RPF.	  He	  then	  
used	  the	  attack	  as	  an	  excuse	  to	  massacre	  Tutsis.	  When	  civilians	  and	  investors	  started	  to	  voice	  
concern	  at	  the	  amount	  of	  killing,	  Habyarimana’s	  response	  as	  a	  norm	  entrepreneur	  was	  to	  hold	  
meetings	  during	  which	  the	  Tutsis	  were	  described	  as	  being	  devils	  (Hilsum,	  1994).	  In	  addition,	  
persons	  at	  the	  meeting	  were	  often	  given	  the	  order	  to	  kill	  Tutsis	  as	  part	  of	  a	  government	  
assignment	  (HIlsum,	  1994).	  This	  seems	  strikingly	  analogous	  to	  the	  experiences	  in	  Milgram’s	  
shock	  experiment.	  It	  is	  easy	  to	  see	  the	  correlation	  between	  a	  government	  that	  extols	  the	  killing	  
of	  Tutsis	  and	  the	  populace’s	  propensity	  to	  kill.	  The	  Hutus	  had	  no	  fear	  of	  reprisal	  as	  the	  
government	  was	  condoning	  the	  murder	  of	  Tutsis.	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   Still	  other	  successful	  attempts	  at	  the	  dehumanization	  of	  the	  Tutsi	  would	  include	  
President	  Habyarimana’s	  creation	  and	  endorsement	  of	  propagandist	  institutions.	  For	  instance,	  
the	  presidentially	  created	  newspaper	  “Kangura”	  extolled	  the	  killing	  of	  the	  Tutsi.	  Following	  the	  
release	  of	  the	  newspaper’s	  editor	  Ngeze	  from	  prison,	  the	  newspaper	  took	  on	  an	  even	  more	  
propagandist	  approach	  to	  the	  Hutu/Tutsi	  conflict.	  With	  the	  support	  of	  the	  administration	  the	  
newspaper	  ran	  stories	  “proving”	  a	  Tutsi	  supremacist	  conspiracy.	  It	  published	  the	  top	  ten	  rules	  
in	  dealing	  with	  the	  Tutsi.	  The	  “commandments”	  decried	  marriage	  to	  a	  Tutsi,	  the	  employment	  of	  
a	  Tutsi,	  and	  the	  participation	  in	  financial	  dealings	  with	  a	  Tutsi	  (Gourevitch,	  1998).	  This	  
newspaper	  was	  run	  in	  conjunction	  with	  a	  politically	  supported	  radio	  station	  called	  Radio	  
Television	  Libre	  des	  Milles	  Collines	  (RTLM)	  or	  One	  Thousand	  Hills	  Free	  Radio	  (Hilsum,	  1994).	  
Both	  of	  these	  media	  outlets	  were	  found	  guilty	  of	  incitement	  to	  genocide	  (International,	  2003).	  
RTLM	  espoused	  hate	  messages	  condemning	  the	  Tutsi	  as	  “cockroaches	  that	  have	  infested	  
Rwanda	  and	  must	  be	  eliminated”	  stating,	  “You	  cockroaches	  must	  know	  you	  are	  made	  of	  flesh!	  
We	  won’t	  let	  you	  kill!	  We	  will	  kill	  you!”	  (Ahluwalia,	  1997;	  Ransdell	  1994).	  This	  illustrates	  the	  
animalization	  of	  the	  Tutsi,	  a	  form	  of	  dehumanization	  that	  truly	  delineates	  human	  and	  non-­‐
human.	  The	  broadcasts	  outright	  discussed	  the	  murder	  of	  the	  Tutsi	  as	  it	  demanded	  the,	  “filling	  
[of]	  the	  graves	  that	  are	  still	  half-­‐empty,”	  stating	  that	  “the	  children	  must	  also	  be	  killed”	  
(Destexhe,	  1994).	  Wilson	  Rutayisure,	  director	  of	  the	  new	  Rwanda	  government	  information	  
service	  stated,	  “The	  message	  was	  that	  a	  Tutsi	  can	  be	  killed	  and	  you	  have	  nothing	  to	  lose.	  In	  fact,	  
you	  have	  everything	  to	  gain”	  (Ransdell,	  1994).	  Endorsement	  of	  murder	  by	  such	  prestigious	  
persons	  as	  were	  these	  norm	  entrepreneurs	  indicated	  it	  was	  a	  command	  and	  the	  Hutus	  were	  
meant	  to	  comply.	  Once	  again,	  the	  similarities	  in	  the	  studies	  mentioned	  previously	  and	  the	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attitudes	  and	  responses	  of	  the	  Hutus	  are	  apparent.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  MIlgram’s	  experiment,	  
respondents	  seemed	  to	  agree	  that	  the	  harming	  of	  the	  learner	  was	  out	  of	  their	  control.	  It	  is	  not	  
unlikely	  that	  this	  same	  opinion	  was	  held	  by	  many	  of	  the	  Hutu.	  	  	  
Stage	  4:	  Organization	  
	   Prior	  to	  the	  extermination	  of	  the	  Tutsi	  it	  was	  important	  to	  organize	  how	  the	  mass	  
murder	  would	  occur.	  Habyarimana	  controlled	  two	  political	  groups,	  the	  MRND	  and	  the	  
Committee	  for	  the	  Defense	  of	  the	  Republic	  (CDR)	  (Hilsum,	  1994).	  Both	  were	  Hutu	  dominated	  
extremist	  groups	  that	  were	  trained	  by	  both	  the	  Presidential	  Guard	  and	  the	  Rwandan	  Army	  at	  
the	  request	  of	  Habyarimana	  himself	  (Ransdell,	  1994).	  These	  organizations	  then	  established	  two	  
militias,	  the	  Interhamwe	  (those	  who	  attack	  together)	  and	  the	  Impuzamugambi	  (those	  who	  have	  
the	  same	  goal);	  together	  their	  participants	  numbered	  approximately	  50,000.	  (Ahluwalia,	  1997).	  
Again,	  each	  group	  received	  instruction	  and	  arms	  from	  the	  Rwandan	  Army.	  Such	  arms	  included	  
grenades,	  AK-­‐47	  assault	  rifles,	  knives,	  clubs,	  bows	  and	  arrows,	  and	  machetes	  (Hilsum,	  1994).	  
The	  arming	  of	  the	  militias	  was	  perpetrated	  by	  the	  President	  himself	  as	  he	  endorsed	  the	  
distribution	  of	  over	  581,000	  machetes	  (Diamond,	  2005).	  	  	  
	   The	  Interhamwe	  and	  Impuzamugambi	  played	  important	  roles	  in	  the	  organization	  of	  the	  
genocide.	  In	  fact,	  Interahamwe’s	  chief,	  Kajuga,	  transformed	  the	  CDR	  into	  a	  “boys’	  club-­‐cum-­‐
death	  squad”	  (Ransdell,	  1994).	  Directly	  following	  the	  news	  that	  Habyarimana’s	  plane	  was	  shot	  
down,	  these	  groups	  organized	  a	  series	  of	  roadblocks	  intended	  to	  capture	  fleeing	  Tutsi	  and	  
murder	  them.	  In	  preparation	  for	  the	  genocide	  caches	  of	  weapons	  were	  hidden	  with	  their	  
whereabouts	  disclosed	  only	  moments	  following	  the	  President’s	  death	  (Hilsum,	  1994).	  The	  
endorsement	  of	  each	  of	  these	  organizations	  by	  the	  Habyarimana	  regime	  was	  no	  secret.	  Many	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were	  aware	  that	  the	  CDR	  was	  the	  extremist	  right	  hand	  of	  the	  President	  himself.	  His	  inaction	  at	  
their	  acts	  of	  dehumanization	  and	  murder	  indicated	  that	  such	  behavior	  was	  to	  be	  mimicked.	  The	  
creation	  and	  maintenance	  of	  such	  organizations	  indicated	  the	  further	  dehumanization	  of	  the	  
out-­‐group,	  as	  their	  role	  was	  clearly	  the	  elimination	  of	  all	  Tutsi.	  The	  affects	  of	  leading	  by	  
example	  were	  experienced	  during	  Jane	  Elliott’s	  experiment.	  Her	  comments	  clearly	  
dehumanized	  the	  out-­‐group	  and	  were	  seen	  as	  an	  introduction	  of	  a	  norm	  and	  an	  example	  of	  
what	  was	  appropriate.	  The	  statements	  she	  made	  allowed	  the	  children	  to	  suspend	  their	  current	  
reality	  such	  that	  they	  began	  to	  take	  on	  the	  roles	  of	  both	  the	  in-­‐group	  and	  out-­‐group.	  This	  is	  
similar	  to	  what	  many	  Hutu	  may	  have	  experienced	  as	  Habyarimana	  and	  others	  endorsed	  the	  
extermination	  of	  the	  Tutsi	  population.	  
Stage	  5:	  Polarization	  
	   With	  the	  bloodless	  coup	  and	  the	  induction	  of	  the	  Habyarimana	  regime	  in	  1978,	  it	  
seemed	  the	  Tutsi	  would	  experience	  a	  reprieve	  from	  the	  harsh	  treatment	  of	  the	  Kayibanda	  
administration.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  the	  Tutsi	  were	  instead	  subjugated	  to	  even	  harsher	  treatment,	  
and	  inevitably	  the	  attempted	  genocide	  of	  their	  people	  (Verwimp,	  2000).	  In	  an	  effort	  to	  keep	  
himself	  from	  close	  examination,	  Habyarimana	  would	  turn	  the	  attention	  of	  the	  Hutu	  populace	  
towards	  the	  subjugation	  of	  the	  Tutsi	  minority.	  Following	  a	  failed	  attempt	  at	  invasion	  into	  
Northern	  Rwanda	  by	  the	  RPF,	  Habyarimana	  responded	  with	  the	  mass	  murder	  of	  Hutu	  dissidents	  
and	  Tutsi	  from	  all	  over	  the	  country	  (Verwimp,	  2000).	  Again	  in	  1990	  Habyarimana	  faked	  an	  
attack	  on	  the	  capital	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  further	  drive	  the	  Hutu	  and	  Tutsi	  apart.	  He	  successfully	  
created	  a	  supposed	  Tutsi	  threat	  (Verwimp,	  2000).	  This	  technique	  creates	  a	  scapegoat	  of	  the	  
out-­‐group	  such	  that	  the	  murder	  of	  said	  individuals	  appears	  to	  be	  the	  solution.	  As	  a	  norm	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entrepreneur,	  Habyarimana	  clearly	  played	  an	  important	  role	  in	  the	  polarization	  of	  the	  Hutu	  and	  
Tutsi.	  	  
There	  was	  also	  the	  revival	  of	  a	  myth	  concerning	  the	  Bahima	  conspiracy	  called	  the	  
Simbinaniye/Micombero	  plot	  which	  stated	  that	  the	  Tutsi	  intended	  to	  kill	  off	  the	  Hutu	  in	  order	  
to	  ensure	  a	  Tutsi	  political	  majority	  (Hintjens,	  1999).	  RTML	  ran	  numerous	  broadcasts	  stating	  that	  
the	  Tutsi	  were	  a	  political	  threat	  (Hilsum,	  1994).	  	  The	  Hutu	  were	  equated	  with	  a	  democratic	  
majority	  or	  “majority	  people	  (rubanda	  nyamwinshi)	  and	  the	  Tutsi	  with	  an	  aristocratic	  and	  
feudal	  minority”	  (Brandstetter,	  1997).	  	  The	  attempt	  by	  the	  regime	  to	  alienate	  Tutsi	  from	  the	  
community	  was	  deemed	  the	  Demokarasi	  project	  and	  Rwanda	  was	  termed	  the	  “Land	  of	  the	  
Hutu”	  (Branstetter,	  1997).	  This	  was	  further	  supported	  by	  the	  distribution	  of	  a	  government	  
pamphlet	  entitled,	  	  
“Livre	  blanc	  sur	  l’aggression	  armee	  don’t	  le	  Rwanda	  a	  ete	  victim	  a	  partir	  du	  
Octobre	  1990	  (White	  book	  concerning	  the	  armed	  aggression	  which	  Rwanda	  has	  
suffered	  since	  October,	  1990)	  which	  mentions	  that	  the	  Ugandan	  President	  
Museveni	  belonged	  to	  the	  ‘Hamitic’	  Hima	  and	  lists	  the	  true	  motive	  of	  the	  
aggressors:	  [To]	  set	  up	  an	  extended	  Hima-­‐Tutsi	  kingdom	  in	  the	  Bantu	  area	  of	  the	  
Great	  Lakes	  region”	  (Brandstetter,	  1997;	  Chretian,	  1991).	  	  
	  
Much	  like	  the	  SPE,	  the	  creation	  of	  such	  a	  polarized	  atmosphere	  allowed	  for	  the	  emergence	  of	  
dehumanizing	  attitudes	  and	  genocidal	  behaviors.	  	  
	   Moreover,	  Presidential	  endorsement	  of	  the	  MRND	  and	  CDR	  clearly	  indicated	  to	  the	  
masses	  Habyarimana’s	  feeling	  towards	  the	  RPF,	  and	  subsequently	  the	  Tutsi.	  During	  the	  Arusha	  
Accords	  the	  MRND	  was	  a	  signatory	  while	  the	  CDR	  rejected	  the	  agreement	  entirely.	  This	  allowed	  
the	  President	  to	  appear	  to	  want	  peace	  on	  the	  surface,	  while	  his	  militias	  operated	  outside	  the	  
political	  system	  to	  bring	  the	  agreement	  to	  a	  standstill.	  Hutu	  and	  Tutsi	  alike	  were	  well	  aware	  of	  
the	  message	  his	  actions	  portrayed,	  Tutsi	  were	  unwanted	  and	  attempts	  at	  a	  peaceful	  agreement	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were	  not	  only	  unlikely,	  they	  were	  not	  a	  part	  of	  his	  agenda.	  Polarizing	  documents	  circulated	  
throughout	  the	  military	  as	  well.	  Authored	  by	  the	  Army	  chief	  of	  staff,	  the	  memorandum	  defined	  
all	  Tutsi	  and	  moderate	  Hutus	  as	  the	  enemy	  (Ransdell,	  1994).	  In	  fact,	  military	  officers	  were	  
strictly	  denied	  the	  opportunity	  to	  marry	  Tutsi	  women	  by	  the	  political	  authority	  (Prunier,	  1995).	  	  	  
Stage	  6:	  Preparation	  
	   	  Preparation	  for	  the	  genocide	  began	  long	  before	  its	  actual	  occurrence.	  The	  ID	  cards	  
generated	  by	  the	  Belgians	  were	  used	  as	  identifying	  markers;	  yet	  this	  required	  little	  effort	  on	  the	  
part	  of	  the	  administration	  and	  the	  militias.	  However,	  the	  making	  and	  distribution	  of	  death	  lists	  
along	  with	  the	  locations	  of	  the	  individuals	  required	  much	  pre-­‐planning.	  These	  lists	  were	  in	  
circulation	  long	  before	  the	  downing	  of	  President	  Habyarimana’s	  plane.	  The	  lists	  identified	  Hutu	  
moderates,	  opponents	  to	  the	  Habyarimana	  administration,	  human	  rights	  activists,	  and	  of	  
course	  politically	  influential	  Tutsi.	  The	  speed	  with	  which	  the	  genocide	  was	  executed	  clearly	  
indicates	  that	  it	  was	  premeditated,	  reportedly	  by	  a	  group	  of	  people	  close	  to	  the	  President	  
(Destexhe,	  1994).	  Over	  and	  over	  again,	  the	  Habyarimana	  regime	  endorsed	  the	  murder	  of	  the	  
Tutsi.	  In	  fact,	  many	  persons	  of	  power	  were	  involved	  in	  the	  crime	  of	  incitement	  to	  genocide.	  
Individuals	  such	  as	  the	  prefect	  of	  Kibuye,	  three	  bourgmestres,	  two	  councilors	  and	  two	  
prominent	  businessmen	  were	  all	  tried	  for	  their	  criminal	  involvement	  (Thronton,	  1999).	  One	  
Rwandan	  recalls,	  “The	  thoughtfulness	  of	  the	  authorities	  ripened	  it	  naturally,	  and	  then	  it	  was	  
proposed	  to	  us.	  As	  it	  was	  their	  only	  proposal	  and	  it	  promised	  to	  be	  final,	  we	  seized	  the	  
opportunity.	  We	  knew	  full	  well	  what	  had	  to	  be	  done,	  and	  we	  set	  to	  doing	  it	  without	  flinching,	  
because	  it	  seemed	  like	  the	  perfect	  solution”	  (Hatzfeld,	  2005).	  Again,	  participants	  of	  the	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genocide	  may	  have	  experienced	  reactions	  similar	  to	  those	  exhibited	  in	  Milgram’s	  shock	  
experiment.	  Obedience	  to	  the	  Rwandan	  authority	  was	  second	  nature.	  	  	  
Stage	  7:	  Extermination	   	  
The	  Rwandan	  genocide	  resulted	  in	  the	  death	  of	  hundreds	  of	  thousands	  in	  as	  little	  as	  
three	  month’s	  time.	  Later	  recognized	  as	  genocide,	  academics	  are	  unable	  to	  come	  to	  a	  
consensus	  as	  to	  its	  cause.	  It	  should	  be	  considered	  that	  instead	  of	  one	  ultimate	  cause,	  the	  
Rwandan	  genocide	  was	  a	  result	  of	  many	  interworking	  pre-­‐existing	  conditions	  that	  were	  primed	  
such	  that	  with	  the	  introduction	  of	  norm	  entrepreneurs	  genocide	  occurred.	  The	  existence	  of	  the	  
aforementioned	  stages	  created	  a	  polarized	  atmosphere.	  Norm	  entrepreneurs	  exacerbated	  such	  
stages	  which	  created	  an	  environment	  conducive	  to	  the	  appearance	  of	  violent	  behaviors.	  
Responses	  documented	  by	  participants	  in	  the	  genocide	  support	  the	  existence	  of	  norm	  
entrepreneurs.	  These	  responses,	  in	  conjunction	  with	  the	  studies	  previously	  discussed,	  help	  to	  
indicate	  that	  actions	  perpetrated	  by	  norm	  entrepreneurs	  during	  and	  preceding	  the	  genocide	  
had	  an	  effect	  on	  individual	  and	  group	  behavior.	  	  	  
Some	  who	  participated	  did	  so	  out	  of	  a	  morbid	  sense	  of	  duty,	  “We	  were	  doing	  a	  job	  to	  
order.	  We	  were	  lining	  up	  behind	  everyone’s	  enthusiasm.	  We	  gathered	  into	  teams	  on	  the	  soccer	  
field	  and	  went	  out	  hunting	  as	  kindred	  spirits”	  (Zimbardo,	  2007).	  These	  participants	  often	  made	  
comparisons	  between	  the	  completion	  of	  a	  job	  and	  the	  killing	  of	  Tutsis,	  “They	  would	  give	  us	  
orders	  about	  the	  killings	  and	  our	  itineraries	  for	  the	  day,	  and	  off	  we	  went…	  We	  got	  on	  fine,	  
except	  for	  the	  days	  when	  there	  was	  a	  huge	  fuss,	  when	  Interahamwe	  reinforcements	  came	  in	  
from	  the	  surrounding	  areas	  in	  motor	  vehicles	  to	  lead	  the	  bigger	  operations.	  Because	  those	  
young	  hotheads	  ran	  us	  ragged	  on	  the	  job…	  Everyone	  was	  hired	  at	  the	  same	  level	  for	  a	  single	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job—to	  crush	  all	  the	  coackroaches”	  (Hatzfeld,	  2005).	  Such	  responses	  parallel	  those	  
documented	  in	  Milgram’s	  study.	  There	  existed	  a	  need	  to	  be	  obedient	  to	  the	  authority,	  the	  
Interahamwe,	  as	  one	  Hutu	  recalls,	  “misinformed	  guys	  had	  come	  to	  the	  meeting	  without	  
bringing	  a	  machete	  or	  some	  other	  cutting	  tool.	  The	  Interahamwe	  lectured	  them:	  they	  said	  it	  
would	  pass	  this	  once	  but	  had	  better	  not	  happen	  twice”	  (Hatzfeld,	  2005).	  Even	  more	  disturbing	  
was	  the	  use	  of	  a	  whistle	  to	  signify	  the	  end	  of	  the	  ‘work’	  day,	  it	  started	  at	  approximately	  9am	  
and	  ended	  around	  5pm.	  	  
Others	  murdered	  out	  of	  fear,	  “Jean-­‐Baptiste,	  if	  you	  want	  to	  save	  the	  life	  of	  your	  wife	  
Speciose	  Mukandahunga,	  you	  have	  to	  cut	  this	  man	  right	  now”	  (Hatsfeld,	  2005).	  Those	  who	  
remained	  killed	  out	  of	  a	  misplaced	  sense	  of	  blame,	  	  
“Our	  Tutsi	  neighbors,	  we	  knew	  they	  were	  not	  guilty	  of	  no	  misdoing,	  but	  we	  
thought	  all	  Tutsis	  at	  fault	  for	  out	  constant	  troubles.	  We	  no	  longer	  looked	  at	  them	  
one	  by	  one,	  we	  no	  longer	  stopped	  to	  recognize	  them	  as	  they	  had	  been	  not	  even	  
as	  colleagues.	  They	  had	  become	  a	  threat	  greater	  than	  all	  we	  had	  experienced	  
together,	  more	  important	  than	  our	  way	  of	  seeing	  things	  in	  the	  community.	  
That’s	  how	  we	  reasoned	  and	  how	  we	  killed	  at	  the	  same	  time”	  (Zimbardo,	  2007).	  	  
	  
Clearly,	  the	  Hutu	  had	  entirely	  dehumanized	  their	  victims,	  “We	  no	  longer	  saw	  a	  human	  being	  
when	  we	  turned	  up	  a	  Tutsi	  in	  the	  swamps.	  I	  mean	  a	  person	  like	  us,	  sharing	  similar	  thought	  and	  
feelings.	  The	  hunt	  was	  savage,	  the	  hunters	  were	  savage,	  the	  prey	  was	  savage—savagery	  took	  
over	  the	  mind”	  (Zimbardo,	  2007).	  
The	  ease	  with	  which	  any	  individual	  may	  perpetuate	  actions	  of	  evil	  is	  evidenced	  by	  this	  
quote	  by	  a	  surviving	  Tutsi	  woman,	  	  
“Before,	  I	  knew	  that	  a	  man	  could	  kill	  another	  man,	  because	  it	  happens	  all	  the	  
time.	  Now	  I	  know	  that	  even	  the	  person	  with	  whom	  you’ve	  shared	  food,	  or	  with	  
whom	  you’ve	  slept,	  even	  he	  can	  kill	  you	  with	  no	  trouble.	  The	  closest	  neighbor	  
can	  kill	  you	  with	  his	  teeth:	  that	  is	  what	  I	  have	  learned	  since	  the	  genocide,	  and	  my	  




Such	  reactions	  seem	  to	  support	  Dr.	  Zimbardo’s	  Lucifer	  Effect.	  In	  mass,	  ordinary	  people	  
participated	  in	  unsubstantiated	  acts	  of	  evil.	  The	  events	  in	  Rwanda,	  coupled	  with	  many	  other	  
instances	  of	  genocide,	  are	  merely	  a	  study	  in	  the	  banality	  of	  evil	  on	  a	  countrywide	  scale.	  
Unfortunately,	  the	  lack	  of	  intervention	  at	  earlier	  stages	  of	  the	  genocide	  may	  have	  resulted	  in	  
the	  death	  of	  hundreds	  of	  thousands.	  	  
Summation	  and	  Future	  Implications	  
	   The	  creation	  of	  ethnic	  and	  racial	  disparity	  between	  the	  Hutu	  and	  the	  Tutsi	  was	  a	  
precipitating	  factor	  to	  the	  genocide.	  It	  was	  important	  that	  a	  distinction	  was	  made	  so	  that	  an	  Us	  
vs.	  Them	  mentality	  could	  prevail.	  This	  difference	  was	  exacerbated	  by	  the	  social	  elevation	  of	  one	  
group	  above	  the	  other.	  The	  suppression	  of	  first	  the	  Hutu	  and	  later	  the	  Tutsi	  only	  rigidified	  the	  
tensions	  between	  the	  ethnic	  groups.	  This	  was	  a	  direct	  result	  of	  the	  Belgians	  and	  their	  successful	  
manipulation	  of	  both	  Hutus	  and	  Tutsis	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  ensure	  demobilization	  of	  the	  colonized	  
masses.	  The	  Belgians	  played	  the	  role	  of	  norm	  entrepreneur	  during	  the	  earlier	  stages	  of	  
polarization	  between	  the	  ethnic	  groups.	  	  
	   The	  problem	  of	  ethnic	  and	  racial	  difference	  was	  only	  escalated	  by	  the	  conditions	  of	  
Rwanda	  and	  its	  inability	  to	  sustain	  such	  a	  sizable	  population.	  It	  is	  not	  unlikely	  that	  people,	  
having	  been	  told	  there	  were	  no	  consequences,	  saw	  genocide	  as	  a	  means	  to	  bolster	  prosperity.	  
Clearly	  there	  was	  a	  severe	  economic	  strain	  and	  scarcity	  was	  not	  a	  possibility	  but	  a	  certainty.	  
Hunger	  was	  coupled	  with	  fear	  as	  there	  was	  also	  a	  likelihood	  that	  if	  you	  were	  Hutu	  or	  Twa	  you	  
could	  just	  have	  easily	  been	  killed	  having	  been	  labeled	  a	  dissident.	  Although	  such	  instances	  such	  
as	  ethnic	  disparity	  and	  food	  scarcity	  created	  a	  super	  charged	  atmosphere,	  it	  was	  the	  norm	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entrepreneur	  that	  lit	  the	  spark	  that	  ignited	  the	  materialization	  of	  murderous	  behaviors.	  As	  a	  
counter	  to	  polarization,	  leadership	  should	  have	  intervened	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  create	  a	  more	  
unified	  state;	  instead	  such	  attitudes	  were	  reinforced	  through	  speeches	  made	  by	  the	  local	  
authorities,	  particularly	  President	  Habyarimana.	  There	  has	  historically	  been	  tension	  between	  
many	  ethnic	  and	  racial	  groups;	  however	  there	  has	  not	  always	  been	  the	  occurrence	  of	  genocide.	  
What	  makes	  people	  accept	  the	  murder	  of	  a	  group	  as	  a	  potential	  modus	  operandi?	  The	  studies	  
cited	  were	  intentionally	  meant	  to	  create	  a	  base	  upon	  which	  the	  theory	  of	  a	  norm	  entrepreneur	  
might	  rest.	  Clearly	  such	  experiments	  have	  demonstrated	  the	  likelihood	  of	  an	  individual	  or	  
individuals	  to	  drastically	  alter	  group	  behavior.	  Matthew	  Hoffman	  attempted	  to	  study	  the	  theory	  
itself	  at	  its	  most	  simplistic	  of	  form.	  His	  experiment	  supported	  the	  ability	  of	  a	  norm	  
entrepreneur	  to	  affect	  group	  choice	  at	  its	  most	  basic	  of	  levels.	  	  
	   The	  concept	  that	  authority	  figures	  can	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  group	  attitudes	  prior	  to	  and	  
during	  genocide	  is	  not	  necessarily	  novel;	  however,	  my	  research	  postulates	  that	  the	  existence	  of	  
a	  norm	  entrepreneur	  is	  possibly	  common	  among	  all	  genocide.	  Regardless	  of	  the	  underlying	  
causes,	  the	  norm	  entrepreneur	  aids	  the	  creation	  of	  norms	  that	  make	  murder	  an	  acceptable	  
alternative.	  Genocide	  is	  not	  something	  that	  arises	  out	  of	  the	  blue,	  but	  is	  rather	  a	  suggested	  and	  
evolutionary	  ideology	  that	  requires	  mass	  acceptance.	  Hopefully,	  the	  indication	  that	  a	  norm	  
entrepreneur	  is	  necessary,	  coupled	  with	  an	  established	  framework	  for	  how	  such	  an	  individual	  
operates,	  will	  allow	  institutions	  such	  as	  the	  UN	  to	  more	  efficiently	  intervene	  in	  pre-­‐genocidal	  
situations.	  This	  thesis	  calls	  to	  question;	  do	  we	  sacrifice	  one	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  all?	  	  	  
	   Although	  this	  paper	  does	  not	  fully	  address	  the	  necessity	  of	  a	  norm	  entrepreneur	  in	  all	  
instances	  of	  genocide,	  that	  would	  require	  extensive	  research	  spanning	  genocide	  throughout	  the	  
57	  
	  
century,	  it	  does	  introduce	  the	  hypothesis.	  Future	  study	  would	  require	  that	  a	  case	  be	  addressed	  
in	  which	  conditions	  such	  as	  those	  experienced	  in	  Rwanda	  are	  evident	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  the	  
norm	  entrepreneur	  however	  genocide	  fails	  to	  occur.	  A	  possible	  example	  would	  be	  the	  
internment	  of	  the	  Japanese	  during	  WWII.	  Japanese	  Americans	  were	  corralled,	  denied	  basic	  civil	  
rights,	  dehumanized	  through	  mass	  distribution	  of	  hate	  propaganda,	  and	  largely	  treated	  as	  
subhuman,	  yet	  genocide	  did	  not	  occur.	  The	  circumstances	  seemed	  primed	  for	  the	  emergence	  of	  
violence;	  however	  the	  possible	  inaction	  of	  prominent	  political	  norm	  entrepreneurs	  failed	  to	  
create	  the	  necessary	  parameters	  that	  would	  have	  allowed	  the	  anonymity	  and	  lack	  of	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Questionnaire:	  We	  would	  like	  to	  ask	  you	  a	  number	  of	  questions	  designed	  to	  find	  out	  your	  
attitudes	  towards	  three	  groups:	  Al	  Qaeda,	  Muslims,	  and	  undocumented	  immigrants.	  	  Please	  circle	  only	  
one	  response	  for	  each	  statement.	  	  The	  numbers	  next	  to	  the	  different	  responses	  are	  there	  just	  to	  
facilitate	  coding	  of	  the	  answers.	  	  When	  you	  are	  finished,	  bring	  the	  form	  to	  the	  front	  and	  exit	  the	  room.	  
About	  Al	  Qaeda,	  I	  consider	  myself	  
• Very	  well	  informed-­‐0	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Moderately	  informed-­‐1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Poorly	  informed-­‐2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Not	  informed	  at	  all-­‐3	  
	  
About	  Muslims,	  I	  consider	  myself	  
• Very	  well	  informed-­‐0	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Moderately	  informed-­‐1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Poorly	  informed-­‐2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Not	  informed	  at	  all-­‐3	  
	  
	  About	  undocumented	  immigrants,	  I	  consider	  myself	  
• Very	  well	  informed-­‐0	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Moderately	  informed-­‐1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Poorly	  informed-­‐2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Not	  informed	  at	  all-­‐3	  
	  
Compared	  to	  other	  groups,	  undocumented	  immigrants	  are:	  
• Very	  inferior	  -­‐0	  	  	  	  Inferior-­‐1	  	  	  	  Slightly	  inferior-­‐2	  	  	  Of	  equal	  status-­‐3	  	  	  Slightly	  superior-­‐4	  	  	  Superior-­‐5	  	  	  Very	  superior-­‐6	  
	  
My	  feelings	  towards	  members	  of	  Al	  Qaeda	  can	  best	  be	  described	  as:	  
• Love-­‐0	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Strong	  like-­‐1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Like-­‐2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Neutral-­‐3	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Dislike-­‐4	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Strong	  dislike-­‐5	  	  	  	  	  	  	  hatred-­‐6	  
	  
Muslims	  are	  demons.	  
• Strongly	  agree-­‐0	  	  	  Agree-­‐1	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  agree-­‐2	  	  	  Neutral-­‐3	  	  	  Somewhat	  disagree-­‐4	  	  	  	  Disagree-­‐5	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Strongly	  disagree-­‐6	  	  
	  
Muslims	  make	  choices	  based	  on	  moral	  principles	  even	  though	  those	  principles	  may	  differ	  from	  my	  own.	  
• Strongly	  agree-­‐0	  	  	  Agree-­‐1	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  agree-­‐2	  	  	  Neutral-­‐3	  	  Somewhat	  disagree-­‐4	  	  	  	  	  Disagree-­‐5	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Strongly	  disagree-­‐6	  
	  
Members	  of	  Al	  Qaeda	  should	  be	  denied	  basic	  human	  rights	  if	  it	  means	  our	  society	  is	  better	  protected.	  
• Strongly	  agree-­‐0	  	  	  Agree-­‐1	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  agree-­‐2	  	  	  Neutral-­‐3	  	  	  Somewhat	  disagree-­‐4	  	  	  	  	  Disagree-­‐5	  	  	  	  	  	  Strongly	  disagree-­‐6	  
	  
Muslims	  lie,	  steal,	  cheat,	  and	  kill	  to	  achieve	  their	  goals.	  
• Strongly	  agree-­‐0	  	  	  Agree-­‐1	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  agree-­‐2	  	  	  Neutral-­‐3	  	  	  Somewhat	  disagree-­‐4	  	  	  	  	  Disagree-­‐5	  	  	  	  	  	  Strongly	  disagree-­‐6	  
	  
Members	  of	  Al	  Qaeda	  lie,	  steal,	  cheat,	  and	  kill	  to	  achieve	  their	  goals.	  
• Strongly	  agree-­‐0	  	  	  Agree-­‐1	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  agree-­‐2	  	  	  Neutral-­‐3	  	  	  Somewhat	  disagree-­‐4	  	  	  	  	  Disagree-­‐5	  	  	  	  	  	  Strongly	  disagree-­‐6	  
	  
I	  feel	  safe	  around	  Muslims.	  
• Strongly	  agree-­‐0	  	  	  Agree-­‐1	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  agree-­‐2	  	  	  Neutral-­‐3	  	  	  Somewhat	  disagree-­‐4	  	  	  	  	  Disagree-­‐5	  	  	  	  	  	  Strongly	  disagree-­‐6	  
	  
Members	  of	  Al	  Qaeda	  have	  no	  respect	  for	  human	  life.	  
• Strongly	  agree-­‐0	  	  	  Agree-­‐1	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  agree-­‐2	  	  	  Neutral-­‐3	  	  	  Somewhat	  disagree-­‐4	  	  	  	  	  Disagree-­‐5	  	  	  	  	  	  Strongly	  disagree-­‐6	  
	  	  
I	  worry	  that	  members	  of	  Al	  Qaeda	  may	  harm	  me	  or	  my	  family.	  	  	  
• Strongly	  agree-­‐0	  	  	  Agree-­‐1	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  agree-­‐2	  	  	  Neutral-­‐3	  	  	  Somewhat	  disagree-­‐4	  	  	  	  	  Disagree-­‐5	  	  	  	  	  	  Strongly	  disagree-­‐6	  
	  
	  
I	  would	  trust	  a	  Muslim	  to	  watch	  my	  children.	  	  	  	  
• Strongly	  agree-­‐0	  	  	  Agree-­‐1	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  agree-­‐2	  	  	  Neutral-­‐3	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  disagree-­‐4	  	  	  	  	  Disagree-­‐5	  	  	  	  	  Strongly	  disagree-­‐6	  
	  	  
Undocumented	  immigrants	  should	  be	  entitled	  to	  basic	  human	  rights.	  	  




I	  worry	  that	  Muslims	  will	  harm	  Americans	  somewhere	  around	  the	  world.	  	  
• Strongly	  agree-­‐0	  	  	  Agree-­‐1	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  agree-­‐2	  	  	  Neutral-­‐3	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  disagree-­‐4	  	  	  	  Disagree-­‐5	  	  	  	  	  	  Strongly	  disagree-­‐6	  
	  
Compared	  to	  other	  groups,	  Muslims	  are:	  
• Very	  inferior-­‐0	  	  	  	  	  	  Inferior-­‐1	  	  	  Slightly	  inferior-­‐2	  	  	  	  	  Equal	  in	  status-­‐3	  	  	  	  	  Slightly	  superior-­‐4	  	  	  	  	  Superior-­‐5	  	  	  Very	  superior-­‐6	  
	  
Muslims	  are	  
• Very	  corrupt-­‐0	  	  Corrupt-­‐1	  	  	  Somewhat	  corrupt-­‐2	  	  	  Neutral-­‐3	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  honest-­‐4	  	  	  honest-­‐5	  	  	  	  Very	  honest-­‐6	  
	  
Undocumented	  immigrants	  and	  members	  of	  my	  own	  group	  are	  equally	  human.	  	  
• Strongly	  agree-­‐0	  	  	  Agree-­‐1	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  agree-­‐2	  	  	  Neutral-­‐3	  	  	  Somewhat	  disagree-­‐4	  	  	  	  	  Disagree-­‐5	  	  	  	  	  	  Strongly	  disagree-­‐6	  
	  
Compared	  to	  other	  groups,	  members	  of	  Al	  Qaeda	  are:	  	  
• Very	  inferior-­‐0	  	  	  Inferior-­‐1	  	  Somewhat	  inferior-­‐2	  	  Of	  equal	  status-­‐3	  	  	  Somewhat	  superior-­‐4	  	  	  Superior-­‐5	  	  Very	  superior-­‐6	  
	  
Undocumented	  immigrants	  make	  choices	  based	  on	  moral	  principles	  even	  though	  those	  principles	  may	  
differ	  from	  my	  own.	  	  
• Strongly	  agree-­‐0	  	  	  Agree-­‐1	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  agree-­‐2	  	  	  Neutral-­‐3	  	  	  Somewhat	  disagree-­‐4	  	  	  	  	  Disagree-­‐5	  	  	  	  	  	  Strongly	  disagree-­‐6	  
	  
Undocumented	  immigrants	  should	  be	  denied	  basic	  human	  rights	  if	  it	  means	  our	  society	  is	  better	  
protected.	  	  
• Strongly	  agree-­‐0	  	  	  Agree-­‐1	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  agree-­‐2	  	  	  Neutral-­‐3	  	  	  Somewhat	  disagree-­‐4	  	  	  	  	  Disagree-­‐5	  	  	  	  	  	  Strongly	  disagree-­‐6	  
	  
Members	  of	  Al	  Qaeda	  and	  members	  of	  my	  own	  group	  are	  equally	  human.	  	  
• Strongly	  agree-­‐0	  	  	  Agree-­‐1	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  agree-­‐2	  	  	  Neutral-­‐3	  	  	  Somewhat	  disagree-­‐4	  	  	  	  	  Disagree-­‐5	  	  	  	  	  	  Strongly	  disagree-­‐6	  
	  
Muslims	  have	  no	  respect	  for	  human	  life.	  	  
• Strongly	  agree-­‐0	  	  	  Agree-­‐1	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  agree-­‐2	  	  	  Neutral-­‐3	  	  	  Somewhat	  disagree-­‐4	  	  	  	  	  Disagree-­‐5	  	  	  	  	  	  Strongly	  disagree-­‐6	  
	  
I	  worry	  that	  Muslims	  will	  harm	  non-­‐Americans	  somewhere	  around	  the	  world.	  	  
• Strongly	  agree-­‐0	  	  	  Agree-­‐1	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  agree-­‐2	  	  	  Neutral-­‐3	  	  	  Somewhat	  disagree-­‐4	  	  	  	  	  Disagree-­‐5	  	  	  	  	  	  Strongly	  disagree-­‐6	  
	  
Members	  of	  Al	  Qaeda	  should	  be	  entitled	  to	  basic	  human	  rights.	  	  
• Strongly	  agree-­‐0	  	  	  Agree-­‐1	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  agree-­‐2	  	  	  Neutral-­‐3	  	  	  Somewhat	  disagree-­‐4	  	  	  	  	  Disagree-­‐5	  	  	  	  	  	  Strongly	  disagree-­‐6	  
	  
I	  worry	  that	  undocumented	  immigrants	  will	  harm	  non-­‐Americans	  somewhere	  around	  the	  world.	  	  
• Strongly	  agree-­‐0	  	  	  Agree-­‐1	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  agree-­‐2	  	  	  Neutral-­‐3	  	  	  Somewhat	  disagree-­‐4	  	  	  	  	  Disagree-­‐5	  	  	  	  	  	  Strongly	  disagree-­‐6	  
	  
Members	  of	  Al	  Qaeda	  are	  no	  more	  inherently	  good	  or	  evil	  than	  anyone	  else.	  	  
• Strongly	  agree-­‐0	  	  	  Agree-­‐1	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  agree-­‐2	  	  	  Neutral-­‐3	  	  	  Somewhat	  disagree-­‐4	  	  	  	  	  Disagree-­‐5	  	  	  	  	  	  Strongly	  disagree-­‐6	  
	  
Undocumented	  immigrants	  are	  	  
• Very	  corrupt-­‐0	  	  Corrupt-­‐1	  	  	  Somewhat	  corrupt-­‐2	  	  	  Neutral-­‐3	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  honest-­‐4	  	  	  honest-­‐5	  	  	  	  Very	  honest-­‐6	  
	  
	  
Members	  of	  Al	  Qaeda	  are	  demons.	  
• Strongly	  agree-­‐0	  	  	  Agree-­‐1	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  agree-­‐2	  	  	  Neutral-­‐3	  	  	  Somewhat	  disagree-­‐4	  	  	  	  	  Disagree-­‐5	  	  	  	  	  	  Strongly	  disagree-­‐6	  
	  
I	  would	  trust	  an	  undocumented	  immigrant	  to	  watch	  my	  children.	  




I	  worry	  that	  members	  of	  Al	  Qaeda	  will	  harm	  non-­‐Americans	  somewhere	  around	  the	  world.	  
• Strongly	  agree-­‐0	  	  	  Agree-­‐1	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  agree-­‐2	  	  	  Neutral-­‐3	  	  	  Somewhat	  disagree-­‐4	  	  	  	  	  Disagree-­‐5	  	  	  	  	  	  Strongly	  disagree-­‐6	  
	  
I	  would	  feel	  safe	  having	  Muslims	  as	  neighbors.	  
• Strongly	  agree-­‐0	  	  	  Agree-­‐1	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  agree-­‐2	  	  	  Neutral-­‐3	  	  	  Somewhat	  disagree-­‐4	  	  	  	  	  Disagree-­‐5	  	  	  	  	  	  Strongly	  disagree-­‐6	  
	  
I	  worry	  that	  Muslims	  may	  harm	  me	  or	  my	  family.	  
• Strongly	  agree-­‐0	  	  	  Agree-­‐1	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  agree-­‐2	  	  	  Neutral-­‐3	  	  	  Somewhat	  disagree-­‐4	  	  	  	  	  Disagree-­‐5	  	  	  	  	  	  Strongly	  disagree-­‐6	  
	  
I	  worry	  that	  undocumented	  immigrants	  may	  harm	  me	  or	  my	  family.	  
• Strongly	  agree-­‐0	  	  	  Agree-­‐1	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  agree-­‐2	  	  	  Neutral-­‐3	  	  	  Somewhat	  disagree-­‐4	  	  	  	  	  Disagree-­‐5	  	  	  	  	  	  Strongly	  disagree-­‐6	  
	  
I	  worry	  that	  members	  of	  Al	  Qaeda	  will	  harm	  Americans	  somewhere	  around	  the	  world.	  
• Strongly	  agree-­‐0	  	  	  Agree-­‐1	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  agree-­‐2	  	  	  Neutral-­‐3	  	  	  Somewhat	  disagree-­‐4	  	  	  	  	  Disagree-­‐5	  	  	  	  	  	  Strongly	  disagree-­‐6	  
	  
Members	  of	  Al	  Qaeda	  make	  choices	  based	  on	  moral	  principles	  even	  though	  those	  principles	  may	  differ	  
from	  my	  own.	  
• Strongly	  agree-­‐0	  	  	  Agree-­‐1	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  agree-­‐2	  	  	  Neutral-­‐3	  	  	  Somewhat	  disagree-­‐4	  	  	  	  	  Disagree-­‐5	  	  	  	  	  	  Strongly	  disagree-­‐6	  
	  
I	  worry	  that	  undocumented	  immigrants	  will	  harm	  Americans	  somewhere	  around	  the	  world.	  
• Strongly	  agree-­‐0	  	  	  Agree-­‐1	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  agree-­‐2	  	  	  Neutral-­‐3	  	  	  Somewhat	  disagree-­‐4	  	  	  	  	  Disagree-­‐5	  	  	  	  	  	  Strongly	  disagree-­‐6	  
	  
Muslims	  and	  members	  of	  my	  own	  group	  are	  equally	  human.	  
• Strongly	  agree-­‐0	  	  	  Agree-­‐1	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  agree-­‐2	  	  	  Neutral-­‐3	  	  	  Somewhat	  disagree-­‐4	  	  	  	  	  Disagree-­‐5	  	  	  	  	  	  Strongly	  disagree-­‐6	  
	  	  
Undocumented	  immigrants	  lie,	  steal,	  cheat,	  and	  kill	  to	  achieve	  their	  goals.	  
• Strongly	  agree-­‐0	  	  	  Agree-­‐1	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  agree-­‐2	  	  	  Neutral-­‐3	  	  Somewhat	  disagree-­‐4	  	  	  	  	  Disagree-­‐5	  	  	  	  	  	  Strongly	  disagree-­‐6	  
	  
My	  feelings	  towards	  undocumented	  immigrants	  can	  best	  be	  described	  as:	  
• Love-­‐0	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Strong	  like-­‐1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Like-­‐2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Neutral-­‐3	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Dislike-­‐4	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Strong	  dislike-­‐5	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Hatred-­‐6	  
	  
My	  feelings	  towards	  Muslims	  can	  best	  be	  described	  as:	  
• Love-­‐0	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Strong	  like-­‐1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Like-­‐2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Neutral-­‐3	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Dislike-­‐4	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Strong	  dislike-­‐5	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Hatred-­‐6	  
	  
Undocumented	  immigrants	  have	  no	  respect	  for	  human	  life.	  
• Strongly	  agree-­‐0	  	  	  Agree-­‐1	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  agree-­‐2	  	  	  Neutral-­‐3	  	  	  Somewhat	  disagree-­‐4	  	  	  	  	  Disagree-­‐5	  	  	  	  	  	  Strongly	  disagree-­‐6	  
	  
I	  would	  feel	  safe	  having	  undocumented	  immigrants	  as	  neighbors.	  
• Strongly	  agree-­‐0	  	  	  Agree-­‐1	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  agree-­‐2	  	  	  Neutral-­‐3	  	  	  Somewhat	  disagree-­‐4	  	  	  	  	  Disagree-­‐5	  	  	  	  	  	  Strongly	  disagree-­‐6	  
	  
Muslims	  are	  no	  more	  inherently	  good	  or	  evil	  than	  anyone	  else.	  
• Strongly	  agree-­‐0	  	  	  Agree-­‐1	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  agree-­‐2	  	  	  Neutral-­‐3	  	  	  Somewhat	  disagree-­‐4	  	  	  	  	  Disagree-­‐5	  	  	  	  	  	  Strongly	  disagree-­‐6	  
	  
Undocumented	  immigrants	  are	  demons.	  
• Strongly	  agree-­‐0	  	  	  Agree-­‐1	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  agree-­‐2	  	  	  Neutral-­‐3	  	  	  Somewhat	  disagree-­‐4	  	  	  	  	  Disagree-­‐5	  	  	  	  	  	  Strongly	  disagree-­‐6	  
	  
I	  feel	  safe	  around	  undocumented	  immigrants.	  




Undocumented	  immigrants	  are	  no	  more	  inherently	  good	  or	  evil	  than	  anyone	  else.	  
• Strongly	  agree-­‐0	  	  	  Agree-­‐1	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  agree-­‐2	  	  	  Neutral-­‐3	  	  	  Somewhat	  disagree-­‐4	  	  	  	  	  Disagree-­‐5	  	  	  	  	  	  Strongly	  disagree-­‐6	  
	  
Muslims	  should	  be	  entitled	  to	  basic	  human	  rights.	  
• Strongly	  agree-­‐0	  	  	  Agree-­‐1	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  agree-­‐2	  	  	  Neutral-­‐3	  	  	  Somewhat	  disagree-­‐4	  	  	  	  	  Disagree-­‐5	  	  	  	  	  	  Strongly	  disagree-­‐6	  
	  
Muslims	  should	  be	  denied	  basic	  human	  rights	  if	  it	  means	  our	  society	  is	  better	  protected.	  
• Strongly	  agree-­‐0	  	  	  Agree-­‐1	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  agree-­‐2	  	  	  Neutral-­‐3	  	  	  Somewhat	  disagree-­‐4	  	  	  	  	  Disagree-­‐5	  	  	  	  	  	  Strongly	  disagree-­‐6	  
	  
Members	  of	  Al	  Qaeda	  are	  
• Very	  corrupt-­‐0	  	  Corrupt-­‐1	  	  	  Somewhat	  corrupt-­‐2	  	  	  Neutral-­‐3	  	  	  	  Somewhat	  honest-­‐4	  	  	  Honest-­‐5	  	  	  	  Very	  honest-­‐6	  
	  
What	  is	  your	  age?	  	  
• Under	  18	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18-­‐21	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22-­‐25	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26-­‐30	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31-­‐40	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  and	  over	  
	  	  
What	  is	  your	  gender?	  	  	  
• Female	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Male	  
	  
What	  is	  your	  religious	  affiliation?	  	  
• Latter-­‐Day	  Saints	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Catholic	  or	  Protestant	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Other	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  None	  





























Deconstruction of the Pat Condell Speech based on a framework set forth by Vollhardt, Coutin, 
Staub, Weiss, and Deflander (2007) (Dawson, 2011) 
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2. Contains instigating elements of continuum of violence 
a. Distinction between us and them.  People referred to by group membership, 
information about origin used to label them as foreigners.  Achieved by pointing 
out affiliation with region, nationality, religion, or language group different than 
the majority of listeners 
b. Individuals/group blamed for misfortune of country (historical/present 
difficulties) 
c. Accused of disloyalty, treachery, alliance with other countries (particularly with 
the enemy) or the previous regime, implying threat and appealing to emotions of 
listeners 
3. Derogatory and violates standards of (argumentative) integrity 
a. Personal attacks/insults on integrity of individual, communication is defaming and 
derogatory 
b. Arguments unbalanced and not objectively verifiable with facts from other 
sources  
c. Legitimacy/ability of individual/group to hold political power and influence is 
questioned, or it is claimed that this person/group has too much power 
d. Targeted group/individual denied distinct characteristics of human nature 
e. Individual/group is threatened, for example with revenge 
4. Suggested strategies do not offer real/constructive solutions to existing problems, and 
serve self-interests of speaker and/or his group while only harming another group 
a. Speaker attains direct political gain and increase in power by harming target 
b. Focus on individuals/groups rather than issue 
c. Focus on alleged source of problems and blaming targeted group/individual, 
accuser offers simplistic solutions and doesn’t take into account 
complexity/multi-faceted nature of societal problems. Promised solution not a real 
solution 
d. Offered solutions destructive rather than constructive in nature, based on 
exclusion of certain individuals/group from political power/society in general 
e. Communicated ideas/suggested solutions for problems not inclusive of all society, 
but instead benefit a specific group while excluding others 








All you Americans who have been following the islamization of Europe from afar, with horrified 
incredulity, if any of you are still nursing the cozy illusion that it could never happen in your 
country, it’s time to wake up and rub those sleepy eyes because the moment of truth has arrived.  
In case you haven’t heard, there’s a plan afoot to build a thirteen story islamic center and 
mosque a few yards from Ground Zero in New York. A plan that’s been enthusiastically 
welcomed by politicians and civic leaders, eager to show how tolerant they are at other peoples’ 
expense. 2c  Is it possible to be astonished but not surprised? 
Apparently, it’s not enough that nearly 3,000 innocent people had to lose their lives in a hideous 
act of religious mass murder, but now their memory has to be insulted as well, and the religion 
that murdered them allowed to build a towering triumphalist mosque on the ground where they 
died. 1a, 1b, 1c, 2d 
Is America losing its mind?! It says a lot about the people behind this scheme that they have the 
bad taste even to propose building a mosque in such a place, but to describe it as they have as a 
tribute to the victims is beyond bad taste, and shows a profound contempt for those who died.  2c 
It would be hard to imagine a more provocative gesture short of standing on their graves and 
burning the American flag. 2d, 1a, 1c  Yet, how typical of Islam, with its own hair-trigger 
sensitivity to the slightest imagined insult, to do something so arrogant and so insensitive. 2a, 1a, 
3b 
It’s going to cost $100 Million dollars to build this thing, but nobody is prepared to say where 
the money’s coming from.  We do know that the Saudis fund a lot of mosque building in the West, 
when they are not busy trying to stamp out free speech at the United Nations or telling Fox News 
what to broadcast, so I guess we’ll all be paying for it every time we start the car. 1a, 1c, 2c, 3b 
You know, it seems to me a much more appropriate place for a mosque in New York would be the 
United Nations building itself, because that organization has become so islamofriendly in recent 
years that frankly I’m surprised it doesn’t already have a minaret. 2c, 3b, 1a, 1c, 2a 
You know, I’m not even American but it makes me sick to my stomach to think that Islam is going 
to be allowed anywhere near Ground Zero because 9.11 could never have happened if not for 
Islam and its teachings and its doctrine of jihad, and its false promise of an impossible afterlife 
without which none of those gullible lunatics would have been persuaded to carry out such an 
insane act.  1a, 2a,  And also because, it wasn’t just an attack on America, but on all of us in the 
civilized world.  As were the bombings in London, in Madrid, in Barley, the shootings in 
Mumbai, and everywhere else that the religion of peace decides it doesn’t like the way people do 
things. 1c, 2d, 2a, 3b, 1b 
Any religion that endorses violence is incapable of delivering spiritual enlightenment. 1a, 2d, 3b, 
1b How obvious does that have to be? And it has no right even to call itself a religion. 2d, 1a, 2b 
Without the shield of religion to hide behind, Islam would be banned in the civilized world as a 
political ideology of hate, and we have no obligation to make allowances for it anymore than we 
do for Nazism. 1c, 2d, 2b, 3b  It’s a bigger threat to our freedom than Nazism ever was. 1b  Yes, 
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both are totalitarian, and both divide the world unnecessarily into us and them, the pure and the 
impure, and both make no secret of their desire to exterminate the Jews, but we were all, more or 
less, on the same side against the Nazis, whereas the islamo-nazis have got plenty of friends 
among people in the West, who ought to know better. 2d, 2c, 3b, 1a, 1c  American politicians 
now regularly make the kind of dhimmi noises about diversity as an excuse for islamization, 1c, 
2c, 2b the same kind of thing that we’ve become so depressingly familiar with in Europe.  It’s 
true that diversity has been good for America; it’s been the making of that country, but American 
diversity has always been grounded in respect for the values, the individual liberties that make 
America what it is.  Islam rejects those values and that’s the difference, and it’s a very important 
difference.  2d, 3b 
Islam despises what America is; it rejects everything America stands for, including freedom and 
diversity, and any Muslim who denies that, is a liar.  1c, 1a, 2a, 2b, 2d, 3b,  
The organization behind this scheme is called “The Cordoba Initiative”, and the building is to 
be called “Cordoba House”.  And this is because Cordoba or Cordo-ba  is the city in southern 
Spain where Muslims built their first great mosque at the start of, and as a symbol of, their 
conquest of Spain. 2b, 3b, 1b The Ground Zero mosque is intended to serve the same purpose in 
America.  1b 
Building mosques on conquered, sacred ground is standard practice. It’s what Islam has always 
done to assert its supremacy, and that is what’s happening here. 1a And, of course, they know 
how insulting it is, how offensive it is. 2a, 2d Are you kidding?  Why do you think they chose a 
site as close as possible to Ground Zero, or do you think that that was just an accident?  And 
they also know that once it’s built, it’ll be there forever as a permanent affront to all Americans, 
gloating in triumph and a major bridgehead in the ongoing stealth jihad. 1a, 1c, 2d, That’s how 
the Muslim world will see it, and that’s how they will be encouraged to see it, and to be fair to 
them, that’s exactly what it will be, confirming what they always suspected, that America is a soft 
country, a decadent country, crippled by political correctness, confused and guilt ridden with no 
backbone and no pride. 2c, 1c, 1a, 3b,  
They plan to open it next year on September the 11th, the tenth anniversary of the atrocity.  Is 
that tasteless enough for you?  I’m surprised they haven’t organized a 757 flight past.  
But you know, it doesn’t have to be this way.  Here in London, we had a similar situation just 
recently where they wanted to build a gigantic  mosque to overshadow the Olympic Games. 
 Public opinion put a stop to that, and Public opinion can put a stop to this disgraceful plan as 
well, and it can tell this group, and the politicians who support them, that enough is enough, and 
that this is one insult too far, and that America is a big country and there is plenty of room for 
them to build their offensive mosque if they have to, somewhere else. 3c,  Somewhere perhaps 
more appropriate to the spirit of their religion, like the Arizona Desert, or Death Valley. 3d  
Peace, and God Bless the Kafa(?)  
